The Institutional Dilemma And Legal Optimization Of Asset Management Credit Enhancement

China ’s asset management business is developing rapidly,and rigid payment is always accompanied by it.For a long time,the effect of rigid payment of principal and guarantee income has been favored by investors in the asset management business,but it is prohibited by supervision due to its systemic risk,and the asset management business has not been silent.Instead.At first,the rules of credit enhancement were scattered in the documents issued by the supervision of various industries,and the rules of major business areas were different.In 2018,the ’ new regulations on asset management ’ clearly listed three cases that are just redemptions.At this time,the regulatory level did not form a consensus on the regulation of asset management credit enhancement,but it was controversial.Supervision has different attitudes towards the provision of credit enhancement by managers ’ related parties.The supervision of the private equity fund industry is clearly prohibited and the " new regulations on asset management " are not mentioned.In view of structured credit enhancement,the private fund industry regulation adopts a restrictive attitude,while the " new asset management regulations " explicitly prohibit structured credit enhancement arrangements.The release of " Nine Minutes " shows its attitude from the judicial level.The attitude of providing credit to managers is consistent with supervision,but it does not mention the effectiveness of providing credit to managers ’ related parties,and recognizes structured asset management credit enhancement,and initially provides a framework for determining the nature of third-party credit enhancement.Therefore,from the perspective of supervision,there are differences in the regulation of asset management credit enhancement,and there is no clear definition of rigid payment,resulting in a blurred boundary between asset management credit enhancement and rigid payment.From the perspective of supervision and judicial regulation,supervision and justice have different attitudes towards credit enhancement,which makes it uncertain,and the feasibility of some credit enhancement design is even more questionable.In addition,the judicial treatment of asset management and credit enhancement disputes also has its unique considerations,so there are more cases of differentiated judgment results and diversified judgment paths.The reason behind it is that there is no uniform standard for the identification of asset management credit enhancement,this is one of them,and the discrete governance model of supervision and justice is the second.Therefore,this paper aims to sort out the evolution of the regulatory path of asset management and credit enhancement,and combine the judgment path of judicial cases to try to construct the identification framework of asset management and credit enhancement from the perspective of financial supervision and judicial collaborative governance,so as to provide ideas for the future identification of the effectiveness of asset management and credit enhancement.Based on this,this paper is divided into four parts :The first part is to sort out the evolution path of regulatory regulation and the dispute of credit enhancement.This chapter first introduces the origin of asset management credit enhancement,makes a typological analysis of the specific operation mode of asset management credit enhancement,and then combs the relevant regulatory paths in detail,mainly from securities,private equity funds and trusts,’ new regulations on asset management ’ and ’ summary of nine people ’ to sort out the relevant regulations on asset management credit enhancement.On this basis,it sorts out the disputes existing in asset management credit enhancement at the regulatory level for later research.The second part is from the practical level,and sorts out the judgment angle and path of asset management credit enhancement disputes.This chapter starts from the judgment results of credit disputes,the distribution of the third party ’s identification of the nature of credit enhancement and the spatial distribution of such disputes.It will provide credit enhancement by the manager,credit enhancement by the related parties of the manager,structured credit enhancement,and the third party ’s identification of the nature of credit enhancement.The judgment results and the path are typed so that the path is summarized and the causes are analyzed later.On the basis of the second part,the third part summarizes the path of judicial adjudication and sorts out the causes of differentiated judgments.This paper summarizes the judgment paths of structured asset management credit enhancement,credit enhancement provided by managers and their related parties,and credit enhancement identified by third parties.The main reasons behind the analysis are the lack of uniform standards for identifying asset management credit enhancement,the difference in the measurement of judicial and regulatory legal interests,and the selective application of judicial regulatory rules.The fourth part mainly combines the previous analysis of the regulatory level and the practical level,and constructs the level of credit enhancement under the collaborative governance of financial supervision and justice.The author believes that the effectiveness of credit enhancement should be divided into two levels :subject and link.Structural credit enhancement is based on subjective intention and objective form arrangement.The nature of the third party ’s credit enhancement is mainly considered from two aspects.