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Defense Cost-Sharing In South Korea-U.S.Relations

Posted on:2022-10-20Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Institution:UniversityCandidate:SEO SEONHEEFull Text:PDF
GTID:2556306326475204Subject:International politics
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
When the U.S.experienced economic crisis in the 1980s,it gave the allies the momentum to share the economic burden.Since then,South Korea has been sharing the cost of stationing American troops with the U.S.by establishing special measures for Article 5 of the SOFA in 1991 and signing a Special Measures Agreement with the U.S.to share defense cost-sharing.Although the agreement originated with the sense that the U.S.allies shared the difficulties of the U.S.,the value of the alliance has been undermined by conflicts and the style of the negotiation became a game of give and take over the past 30 years.Especially,President Trump,who has been skeptical of the allies,complained that the allies,including South Korea,did not pay adequate compensation for security services provided by the U.S.,and finally demanded an exorbitant increase.The 10th Special Measures Agreement was the most difficult negotiation,with the U.S.making monetary concessions and Korea reaching a compromise in terms of time.However,the agreement period,which was only one year,soon led to the start of new negotiations,and the U.S.strongly demanded an increase in defense cost-sharing.Unable to narrow the opinion gap between South Korea and the U.S.,President Trump eventually rejected the tentative agreement and the negotiations returned to the beginning.Accordingly,this research analyzed the issue of the ROK-U.S.Special Measures Agreement by applying it to the framework of Robert Putnam’s Two-level game theory.The two-level game theory was devised by Putnam to analyze international negotiations and claims that international negotiations are proceeding in two phases at the same time.The government,which is the representative negotiator,must reach a favorable agreement in the negotiations internationally.Meanwhile domestically it must strive to obtain formal or informal ratification of the tentative agreement by various interest groups in the country.Putnam presented the win-set as the core concept in the two-level game theory,which means a collection of all the agreements in the first phase that can be ratified in the second phase.In addition,Putnam presented three notions as factors that influence the determination of the win-set size.Therefore,the ROK-U.S.Special Measures Agreement can be applied to the two-level game theory to analyze how actors in phases 1 and 2 interact with each other and how they affect international negotiations.Additionally,it is possible to predict the size of the win-set that Korea and the U.S.will have in the negotiations based on the determinants of the win-set.Finally,the problems of the Special Measures Agreement can be raised,and solutions presented.Hence,the results derived from this study are as follows.First,the South Korea government,which is a player in the first phase,strongly responded that the government could not accept the Trump administration’s demand for a five-fold hike by collecting opinions from the National Assembly,political parties,public opinion,and experts.This shows that the opinions of domestic ratification groups and the pros and cons of ratification have a great influence on the government participating in international negotiations.Second,in the case of South Korea,the Special Measures Agreement is a foreign matter,and the interest of domestic groups in the matter is complicated and has a great influence on the government.Thus,it is not easy to obtain ratification from the National Assembly in terms of institutional aspects.Plus,South Korea pursues a negotiation strategy that reduces the win-set by turning the issue into a political issue or officially announcing its commitment to the public.On the other hand,in the case of the U.S.,the favorability and support ratings of the U.S.public opinion of the Korea-U.S.alliance is somewhat high.In addition,the U.S.Congress agrees with the need to raise the defense cost-sharing of its allies,but they consider that the most important thing is to strengthen the relationship between Korea and the U.S.by restoring the current alliance.Therefore,the U.S.Congress will not agree to the government’s unconvincing demand to increase defense cost-sharing.Finally,the Trump administration proposed a reduction or withdrawal of U.S.Forces Korea strategy when negotiating with South Korea economically or militarily.However,it is expected that the Biden administration will no longer put pressure on South Korea.As a result,the 11th Special Measures Agreement is expected to be concluded with a satisfactory result.Then,on March 10th,South Korea and the U.S.reached agreement on the 11th Special Measures Agreement in Washington.For the last 70 years,South Korea and the U.S.have been at odds over the U.S.Forces Korea,defense cost-sharing negotiations,the transfer of Wartime Operational Control to Korean government,and discrepancy in views and policies on North Korea.Nevertheless,South Korea and the U.S.have been cooperating by showing off their solidarity and expanding their alliance in economic,political,cultural,and military fields.At times,the Korea-U.S.alliance has experienced crises,but the two countries have tried to recover from such crises together to advance their friendship and the Korea-U.S.alliance has continued to the present.
Keywords/Search Tags:Korea-U.S.Alliance, Special Measures Agreement, Two-level game theory, Diplomatic Negotiation
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