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An Analysis Of Trump Administration’s National Alliance Policy From The Perspective Of Two-level Game Theory

Posted on:2022-08-26Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:L L JinFull Text:PDF
GTID:2506306320465824Subject:Political science
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Since the Trump administration came to power,populist nationalism and isolationism in the United States have risen,and US foreign policy has shown a gradual inward trend.This strategic contraction has also affected the United States’national alliance policy.The United States has begun to withdraw frequently or adjust some international mechanisms and agreements.Although compared with previous presidents,the Trump administration’s foreign policy decisions are regarded as a very"willful" performance,but the essence of its policies has not actually changed much.They are all aimed at safeguarding U.S.hegemony in the international arena and trying to pull the United States back from its relative decline.However,under Trump’s "America First" ruling philosophy,unnecessary international expenditures or international organizations or agreements that are detrimental to the interests of the United States are regarded as abandoned by the Trump administration.This behavior has caused a lot of impact internationally.Therefore,in order to explore the domestic and international political reasons for the Trump administration to make such a decision,this article selects Putnam’s two-level game theory as the theoretical basis,and combines the content of repeated games to establish a static and dynamic game model.Through the sub-model from the perspectives of domestic game and foreign game,taking the US request to re-negotiate North American Free Trade Agreement as an example,analyze the Trump administration’s decision-making process in the face of re-negotiation of NAFTA.The characteristics of the national alliance policy of the Lampe government.Specifically,the content of the analysis is mainly carried out from the following aspects:This article mainly explores how domestic-level actors,such as interest groups,administrative agencies,and legislatures,have legitimized their own policy preferences through the country’s political system.And how international-level negotiators use different negotiation strategies,such as future expected return strategies,issue linkage strategies,collusion strategies,etc.,to expand the initial winning set formed at the domestic level,and make the winning set intersection between negotiating countries continue to expand.Through the research of this article,it can be found that:1.During the Trump administration,the US national alliance policy was affected by multiple factors,which are mainly divided into two levels:international and domestic political system of the separation of powers in the United States stipulates Domestic interest groups and voters expressing their policy preferences can only achieve their goals by influencing the three power institutions of the executive,legislative and judicial.The game between different actors at the domestic level played a key role in the re-negotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement by the United States and determined the initial winning set of US negotiators at the international level.The influence of the game between international level negotiators on the final winning set cannot be ignored.When negotiating with other countries,the United States needs to use various strategies to try to expand the intersection of the interactive two or more domestic winning sets,and reach an order as much as possible.The content of the agreement accepted by a wider range of domestic-level actors;Second,the changes in the Trump administration’s national alliance policy are not only related to changes in the interest preferences of different domestic actors and the process of international negotiations,but also related to domestic isolationism and unilateralism.And so on the influence of mainstream thought.Isolationism and trade protectionism and other ideas have reduced the United States’ domestic winning sets,leading to deviations in the equilibrium results produced by domestic and international levels of games;third,the economic interconnection and dependence between countries is the internal driving force for international agreements.Motivation,common interests between countries are the basis for cooperation.
Keywords/Search Tags:two-level game theory, Trump administration, North American Free Trade Agreement, national alliance policy
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