| U.S.policy objectives toward South Asia influence U.S.perceptions of Pakistan and thus U.S.policy toward Pakistan.The Carter administration,which took office in January 1977,pursued a foreign policy that differed from that of its predecessors.In terms of the Carter administration’s perception of Pakistan,there are three main levels:global,regional,and national.At the global level,Pakistan was a country that violated the Carter administration’s nonproliferation policy as well as a frontline country that helped contain Soviet expansion.It was not until after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 that the Carter administration realized the strategic importance of Pakistan and thus changed its perceptions and policy toward Pakistan.At the national level,the Carter administration saw Pakistan as politically undemocratic and economically backward.The initial phase of the Carter administration’s policy toward Pakistan was from January to July 1977,when Carter came to power on July 5,1977,a military coup took place in Pakistan and Bhutto was arrested and imprisoned.During this period,the Carter administration was very concerned about the introduction of the French nuclear fuel reprocessing plant by the Bhutto government and pressured the Bhutto government to abandon the construction of the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant.In March 1977,general elections were held in Pakistan.Bhutto’s PPP won by a wide margin.The defeated Pakistan National Alliance(PNU)refused to accept the election results on the grounds of Bhutto’s electoral fraud and launched a national protest.To stabilize the political situation in the country,the Bhutto government sent military and police to crack down in the troubled areas.The Carter administration considered Bhutto’s move a serious violation of human rights and therefore banned the sale of tear gas to Pakistan.For the Pakistan National Alliance(PNU),the U.S.move is tantamount to announcing to the world that it does not support the Bhutto government and is sympathetic to the PNU.The demonstrations of the Pakistan National Alliance against the Bhutto government have intensified,which has seriously affected the political and economic development of Pakistan.To win the hearts of the people,Bhutto played the anti-American card,accusing the United States of interfering in Pakistan’s internal affairs.The Carter government tried to prevent Pakistan from building a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant,while trying to clear the suspicion of interfering in Pakistan’s internal affairs.In the case of nuclear fuel reprocessing plants,the Carter administration knew that Bhutto did not intend to abandon the introduction of French reprocessing plants and cut off aid to Pakistan as a punishment.But the Carter administration’s move failed to change the Bhutto government’s decision to develop a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant.The July 5,1977,coup d’état in Pakistan prevented the U.S.from dealing with Bhutto again.Carter was more sympathetic to Bhutto’s plight.During this period,the Carter administration’s policy toward Pakistan focused on preventing the Bhutto government from developing nuclear weapons,but the Pakistani election controversy made its nonproliferation policy ineffective.Zia-ul-Haq’s military coup on July 5,1977,until the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 25,1979,was the midterm phase of the Carter administration’s policy toward Pakistan.The Carter administration adopted a tacit attitude toward Zia-ul-Haq’s military coup,believing that the coup would help end civil strife in Pakistan,but urged Zia-ul-Haq to returnm to power as soon as possible by holding general elections,abandoning the construction of nuclear fuel reprocessing plants,and promising not to conduct nuclear test explosions or transfer nuclear technology or sensitive materials.After Zia-ul-Haq took office,the Carter administration continued to urge him to abandon the construction of a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant while assessing his time frame.The Carter administration did not accuse Zia-ul-Haq of coming to power through a military coup,and was more friendly to Zia-ul-Haq in terms of the time frame.Zia-ul-Haq actively approached the United States after the coup,revealing the reasons for his coup and assuring him of his ability to hold new elections and re-establish a democratically elected government as soon as possible.As Pakistan’s elections were held indefinitely,the Carter administration grew disgusted with the Zia-ul-Haq government.Meanwhile,the Zia-ul-Haq government charged Bhutto with numerous crimes and eventually sentenced and executed him to death.The Carter administration saw Zia-ul-Haq’s execution of Bhutto as a way to remove obstacles to his long-lasting military dictatorship,and its dislike for him grew.In the context of nuclear non-proliferation,the Carter administration sought to understand Zia-ul-Haq’s attitude toward nuclear fuel reprocessing plants.Zia-ul-Haq refused to abandon the NPP on the grounds that the interim government could not reverse the major decisions of the previous government and that a new government would soon be formed in Pakistan.In an effort to prevent Pakistan from developing a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant,the Carter administration turned to France for cooperation in getting it to give up the plant to Pakistan.On August 20,1978,after persistent U.S.persuasion,France cancelled the agreement to transfer the fuel reprocessing plant to Pakistan.After France broke the deal,the Carter administration proposed to resume aid to Pakistan.Just when the Carter administration thought it had succeeded in stopping Pakistan’s nuclear development,U.S.intelligence indicated that Pakistan was pursuing other forms of nuclear development and attempting to conduct nuclear test explosions.This sparked intense concern from the Carter administration.The Carter administration pressed Pakistan to ensure that the Zia-ul-Haq government would not pursue nuclear development or detonate any nuclear explosive devices and would not transfer to other countries materials,sensitive equipment and technology,or nuclear fuel reprocessing plant equipment that could be used to make nuclear weapons.The Zia-ul-Haq government,in an effort to avoid offending the Carter administration,gave assurances that it would not build nuclear weapons or transfer nuclear technology to other countries.After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 25,1979,Pakistan’s strategic position rose significantly,opening the final phase of the Carter administration’s policy toward Pakistan.In a change from its previous cold attitude toward Pakistan,the Carter administration immediately began planning for aid to Pakistan.Although the Pakistani nuclear issue still existed,it could no longer influence the Carter administration to adjust its policy toward Pakistan.At this time,the Carter administration was too wary of dealing with the Pakistani nuclear issue to let it become a stumbling block to U.S.-Pakistani cooperation against the Soviet Union.But the Carter administration,fearing that the Zia-ul-Haq government would conduct nuclear test explosions and transfer nuclear technology to other countries,repeatedly sought assurances from the Zia-ul-Haq government.The Zia ul-Haq government also made several verbal assurances to appease the Carter government,but continued to engage in nuclear development.The Carter government,in an effort to gain Pakistan’s cooperation against the Soviet Union,informed Pakistan of the size and quantity of aid.But the Ziaul-Haq government,dissatisfied with the small amount of U.S.aid to Pakistan and in view of the painful lessons of the U.S.betrayal of Pakistan in the past,did not agree to the aid package proposed by the Carter administration and jokingly called the Carter administration’s aid a few grains of peanuts.Thereafter,the Carter administration did not see a massive increase in the amount of aid to Pakistan because of Pakistan’s refusal,and certainly could not draw Pakistan into anti-Soviet cooperation with it.The Carter administration repeatedly negotiated with the Zia-ul-Haq government,but no constructive results were achieved. |
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