Form And Matter

In order to deal with Hume’s doubts about the universality and inevitability of knowledge,Kant proposed that the phenomenal world has two parts of the content,namely the material as the content of the phenomenon and the form as the law of the phenomenon,in which the material as the content comes from the stimulation of the senses by the object itself,and as the form of the law of the phenomenon is our innate possession.But there are two problems with this statement,and the whole paper examines these two issues.The idea of writing this article is to first explore the composition of Kant’s phenomenal world,point out the two main problems in it,and then explore and solve these two problems separately,and finally draw conclusions about the relevant problems.Chapters I and II are introductions and introductions,respectively.The introduction of the first chapter mainly introduces the reasons for the selection of the topic of this paper,the relevant literature review and the research methods.The second chapter is an introduction to the problem,Kant in response to Hume’s questioning of the universality and necessity of knowledge by presenting his characteristic view of the phenomenal world,explaining how Kant views the phenomenal world in the traditional understanding,and the possible problems of this traditional understanding of Kant’s texts.Kant believed that the world before us is merely phenomena,and that this phenomenal world is mainly composed of two parts,one is the form of laying the rules for the world,and the other is providing the material for the world.First of all,according to the traditional understanding of what Kant pointed out as the content of phenomena,independent of the existence outside the phenomenon.But this traditional view leads to contradictions in Kant’s philosophical system.Because,according to Kant’s principle,transcendental categories can only be applied to the realm of experience,the existence of a thing beyond phenomena cannot be determined.But if the thing itself is influencing the mind and producing the "material" as the content of the phenomenon,this also applies the category of a priori causality outside the realm of experience and affirms the existence of the thing itself.Therefore,Kant’s two statements are contradictory,and the traditional interpretation of the source of the material is problematic.Second,there is the question that exists between form and phenomenon: how does the innate form of man explain why the world is the way it is? Kant believed that the form that man has as a law is the source of world order.But it is not enough to explain why the world is the way it is in terms of innate forms,because even if the whole world follows an innate form,it cannot explain the order of the world before us.For example: why at a certain moment,the world in front of us is green and forested instead of a sea of golden sand? Therefore,there are also problems with the origin of the form of the world(special laws).These are the two problems faced by Kant’s philosophy that this article intends to address,namely,the problem of the source of material and the problem of the source of form.Chapters III and IV address these two issues.Chapter 3 aims to address the first problem without destroying Kant’s philosophical system,exploring the question of the origin of material,that is,how it is possible that "things themselves trigger the senses to produce material".The solution to this problem can be divided into two main steps.First,to determine what the state of existence of things is like,this article attempts to address this in the first section of this chapter.We first explore the answers to this question by previous scholars,and then we conclude that of the answers of the scholars discussed,Allison’s explanation of the question "what is the state of existence of the thing itself" is the most acceptable.Second,after determining the state of existence of the thing itself,this paper will solve the problem of "how the thing itself that exists in a certain state of existence is triggered",and again,we think that Allison’s explanation of this problem is relatively the most appropriate.Finally,we conclude that,in adhering to Allison’s explanation,we believe that the answer to the "trigger" question can go one step further,that is,not only is the process of triggering the senses by the object itself a logical hypothesis,but the material is also a logical assumption as a result of the thing’s own triggering of the senses,and the material itself is equivalent to the material.Chapter 4 deals with the question of the origin of special laws,that is,the origin of forms(the laws of the world),because we believe that Kant’s innate forms are not enough to explain why the world is the way it is.In this chapter,we argue that the particular laws of the world derive either from man’s innate form or from the thing itself.After a series of discussions,we believe that the idea that special laws derive entirely from form is untenable.The second explanation is that special laws come from things themselves.This interpretation is supported by some Kantian text,but the main problem is that it is very likely to conflict with Kant’s principles,such as the principle of "the unknowable of things in themselves".However,after exploring these issues,we believe that they can be reasonably resolved.Therefore,this paper argues that the special laws of the phenomenal world come from the object itself,and are the product of the combination of the difference and innate form of the thing itself.But at the same time,we also believe that this explanation also follows Allison’s logic as set forth in Chapter 3,that the special laws of the world come from things themselves,which are the result of a logical assumption,not a kind of knowledge.Chapter 5 summarizes this article.In adhering to Alison’s view,we believe that whether material is equivalent to the thing itself,or that special laws originate from the combination of the thing itself and form,these two answers are only logical assumptions,and they cannot be combined with human intuition,and do not have the possibility of being intuitive.But whether such an answer is consistent with Kant’s other texts,and whether it conflicts with Kant’s other principles,is a topic that needs to be explored in more detail.