An Incentive Mechanism To Promote Renewable Energy Consumption Under Renewable Portfolio Standard

With the development of renewable portfolio standard and the proposal of carbon peaking and carbon neutrality goals,electricity retailers have become the main role in promoting the consumption of renewable energy.The decision-making of government and residents could have an impact on renewable energy consumption of retailers when they play the roles of regulating and trading.However,the existing mechanism could not organically combine the government,electricity retailers and residents,and the decision-making of these three subjects still has improvement for better performance.Therefore,how to design an effective incentive mechanism to achieve a significant increase in renewable energy consumption becomes an urgent problem to be solved.First,this paper introduces the research status of renewable portfolio standard at home and abroad,and then clarifies its basic connotation and expounds the important significance of implementing renewable portfolio standard in our country.Second,a Stackelberg game model including government and electricity retailers is constructed under multi-market.As a leader,the government is responsible for formulating reward and punishment strategies to supervise the renewable energy consumption behavior of electricity retailers to maximize the renewable energy consumption ratio;The electricity retailers realize the maximization of profit by adjusting its purchasing and selling strategy.The model is solved by particle swarm optimization algorithm after the prove of existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium,and the influence of green certificate price and incentive responsibility weight on Stackelberg equilibrium is discussed.Then,considering the government,electricity retailers and residents,a two-level Stackelberg game model with three subjects is constructed.In the upper-level game model,the government,as the leader,sets the optimal monetary incentive to minimize its cost,and then the electricity retailers determine its optimal monetary incentive or price incentive to maximize its profit.In the lower-level game model,the electricity retailers play a leading role and then assumes the responsibility of increasing the consumption of renewable energy by formulating incentive strategies,while the residents choose the optimal consumption ratio of renewable energy to maximize their own welfare.After proving the existence and uniqueness of Stackelberg equilibrium,the optimal strategy of each subject is solved by backward induction theory.Meanwhile,considering the seasonal variation of power demand,the influence of different incentive subjects and forms on the Stackelberg equilibrium is studied under three seasonal typical days.Finally,this paper summarizes that the proposed incentive mechanism can reasonably balance the decision-making of government,electricity retailers and residents,and effectively improve the consumption level of renewable energy.Meanwhile,the future research is also discussed.