| In the middle of the last century,in the two-factor economic theory proposed by Louis Kelso,it was first advocated that employees share in the future earnings of the company by purchasing equity in the company.The company implements an employee share ownership plan,whereby employees align their interests with those of the company by subscribing to shares in the company,allowing for improved company performance while also allowing for increased employee earnings.However,due to the late and immature development of China’s employee stock ownership plan,in a realistic situation,many listed companies’ employee stock ownership plans have suffered losses,and even liquidation and position blowouts,with no further gains for the individual employee or the company.With knowledge of the relevant literature,this thesis selects KLY Company as the case study object,dissects the occasion of KLY Company to carry out employee share ownership plan and sorts out its implementation process,and then finds that the implementation of this stock ownership plan is ineffective by longitudinally comparing the change trends of four aspects,namely human resources,business performance,stock price and employee participation enthusiasm during the period of the stock ownership plan with the motivation.After that,through in-depth analysis,it is found that the immediate causes for the poor implementation of employee share ownership scheme of KLY Company are setting high proportional leverage,reliance on capital market for stock trading,unreasonable distribution of shareholding ratio,short setting of term and setting up of a mechanism to make up the difference between controlling shareholders,which make the risky return of employees unstable and unfavorable to the long-term incentive of stock ownership plan.In addition,KLY’s lack of control over risks,its concentrated shareholding structure and the absence of an effective supervisory body indicate that its corporate governance mechanism is flawed,which,to a certain extent,amplifies the adverse effects of the company’s operations and finances,while also increasing the uncertainty of the returns of shareholding employees.It is the potential risks associated with the governance mechanisms that are the more critical reason for the poor implementation of the employee share ownership plan.Based on the above analysis,this thesis proposes recommendations for the future implementation of KLY’s employee share ownership scheme in terms of both the design of the scheme and the corporate governance mechanism.Through an in-depth analysis of the performance of the implementation effect of KLY’s employee share ownership scheme and its causes,it not only enriches the relevant research on the system from the perspective of individual cases,but also serves as a reference and inspiration for other companies and regulatory authorities. |
