Study On Supply Chain Coordination Of Fresh Agricultural Products Considering Preservation Effort Under Uncertainty Of Production And Demand

At present,the risk of output and demand in the upstream and downstream of fresh fruits and vegetables agricultural products supply chain and the high loss rate of fresh agricultural products make it difficult for each member of the supply chain to make production input,fresh-keeping effort and order decision.In the context of uncertain production and preservation efforts,how supply chain members make decisions in order to maximize their own interests,and how to balance the interests of the three from the overall interests of the supply chain coordination.This points out the research direction of this paper,that is,based on the off-line operation mode of the cold chain logistics transportation of fresh fruits and vegetables agricultural products contracted by the third party logistics enterprises,in a three-tier fresh fruits and vegetables produce supply chain composed of producers,retailers and third-party logistics service providers,under the situation of uncertain production and demand and keeping fresh effort,the planning production input,fresh-keeping effort level and order quantity of the three products were analyzed.Firstly,this paper establishes the stochastic function of output and demand of fresh agricultural products,and introduces it into the expected profit function of supply chain in centralized and decentralized modes,respectively,and analyzes the optimal planned production input of manufacturers,the optimal fresh-keeping efforts of third-party logistics service providers and the optimal order quantity decision of retailers in centralized and decentralized modes,and finds that the decisions of all members of supply chain in decentralized mode are lower than those in centralized mode,and the overall benefit of supply chain is greatly reduced.Secondly,in order to improve the performance of the whole supply chain,this paper uses revenue-sharing contract and “Revenue-sharing-compensation strategy” to coordinate the supply chain.The research shows that under the single revenue sharing contract,only the retailer’s profit is lower than that under decentralized decision-making.At this time,the retailer is unwilling to implement this contract,so simple revenue sharing can’t realize the coordination of supply chain.In order to ensure the retailer’s profit not to be lost,it is necessary for the manufacturer and the Third Party Logistics Service provider to make concessions and add price compensation strategy on the basis of revenue-sharing contract to encourage the retailer to participate in cooperation,it was found that portfolio contracts could achieve conditional supply chain coordination as well as Pareto efficiency.Finally,the model and contract are analyzed by numerical analysis,and the results show that:(1)Under the condition of keeping other parameters unchanged,the optimal decision-making and profit of each member of the supply chain will increase with the increase of consumers’ freshness sensitivity coefficient;(2)Under the condition of keeping other parameters unchanged,When the average output rate is greater than 0.5,with the increase of the average output rate,the manufacturer can obtain higher profits with lower production output,and the increase in the average market demand will simultaneously improve the profits of each member of the supply chain and the overall profit;(3)Under the condition of keeping other parameters unchanged,Under decentralized and centralized decision-making,the optimal decision-making and profit of the producer and retailer increase with the increase of the average demand,while the optimal effort level of the third-party logistics service provider is not affected by the stochastic demand,but its profit increases with the increase of average demand;(4)Single revenue-sharing can not achieve supply chain coordination,but combined contracts can achieve the third party logistics service providers to improve the level of preservation efforts and supply chain Pareto efficiency,and we get the range of the cost that the producer and the third party logistics service provider are willing to compensate under the different sharing coefficient within the range of the revenue sharing coefficient that satisfies the condition,the size of the compensation depends on their bargaining power.