Research On Tripartite Coordination Of Fresh Supply Chain Under Asymmetric Information Of Fresh-keeping Effort Level

In recent years,the operation mode of China’s fresh food industry has been continuously innovated.Especially since the covid-19 outbreak,the fresh electricity supplier mode has provided the consumers with the convenience of "contactless" fresh shopping,and has become one of the most promising fresh operation modes.However,in the post epidemic era,if we want to retain consumers,we must establish a more stable and sustainable fresh supply chain.Compared with ordinary commodities,the perishable characteristics of fresh commodities have higher requirements for preservation during transportation.Therefore,due to the consideration of preservation cost and professionalism,the transportation,preservation and other services of fresh commodities in the fresh supply chain are often outsourced to professional third-party logistics service providers(TPL).However,TPL may falsely report its fresh-keeping efforts in order to reduce the cost of its preservation efforts and maximize its own interests,resulting in the problem of asymmetric information on the fresh-keeping efforts in the fresh supply chain,resulting in serious loss of fresh commodities and inconsistent quality and price of fresh commodities obtained by consumers.In addition,with the development of Internet plus,more and more fresh suppliers have opened their own online channels to consumers,creating a new double channel operation mode.The emergence of this mode has increased sales channels to a greater extent,and has also satisfied consumers’ demand for online fresh shopping.But also because of the market share of fresh suppliers and fresh electricity providers,the dominant supplier of fresh supply chain has changed.This has caused channel conflict between the two sides,hindered the win-win cooperation of all subjects in the fresh supply chain,and increased the difficulty of supply chain coordination.It can be seen that designing appropriate contracts to coordinate the fresh supply chain,improve the fresh-keeping efforts of TPL,protect the interests of all subjects and the overall interests of the supply chain,and contribute to the sustainable and healthy development of the fresh e-commerce industry.Starting from reality,this paper discusses the information asymmetry of TPL fresh-keeping effort level under the two scenarios of single channel and dual channel supply chain,and designs reasonable contracts to realize the coordination and Pareto improvement of fresh supply chain.The main research contents are as follows:Firstly,this paper takes the realistic scene of the fresh industry as the background,takes the current research at home and abroad as the guidance,and makes an in-depth supplement to the coordination research of the fresh supply chain from a comprehensive perspective.By combing the concepts of the fresh supply chain,TPL,information asymmetry and Stackelberg game theory,this paper lays a sufficient theoretical foundation for the subsequent Coordination Research of the fresh supply chain in different situations.Secondly,build a three-level supply chain composed of fresh suppliers,TPL and fresh e-commerce.Considering that the market demand is jointly affected by the price of fresh goods and the level of fresh-keeping efforts of TPL,take fresh e-commerce as the main guide,establish the profit models of all parties under the mode of centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making based on Stackelberg game,and add the information concealment coefficient of fresh-keeping efforts to solve the problem of information asymmetry of TPL fresh-keeping efforts,The optimal decision-making and profit under each decision-making mode are solved.Through the comparative analysis of the decision-making results,the importance of fresh supply chain coordination is highlighted,and the "fresh-keeping cost sharing" contract is designed to coordinate the supply chain.Finally,a numerical example is used to analyze the impact of TPL fresh-keeping effort level information asymmetry on the profits of each subject,It is verified that the "fresh-keeping cost sharing" contract effectively improves the fresh-keeping efforts and profits of TPL members under certain conditions,and realizes the coordination of supply chain and Pareto improvement.Then,considering the actual situation,for the dual channel model of fresh food suppliers adding online direct sales channels,the cross price elasticity coefficient is introduced,the fresh food suppliers are the main guide,the market demand function and profit model of all parties are reconstructed based on Stackelberg game,and the decision-making results and profit changes of all subjects when the information of TPL fresh-keeping effort level is symmetrical and asymmetric are deeply discussed,The mixed contract of "fresh-keeping cost sharing + revenue sharing" is designed to coordinate the fresh-keeping dual channel supply chain.Finally,through a numerical example,the effects of the market demand sensitivity coefficient of fresh-keeping effort,the cost coefficient of fresh-keeping effort,the information concealment coefficient of TPL fresh-keeping effort level and Online market proportion coefficient of suppliers on the decision-making and profits of each subject are analyzed,and the mixed contract of "fresh-keeping cost sharing + revenue sharing" is verified under certain conditions,It can alleviate the channel conflict between fresh suppliers and fresh e-commerce,improve the fresh-keeping effort level of TPL,increase the market demand of fresh dual channel supply chain and the profits of all parties,realize Pareto improvement,and verify the scientificity and effectiveness of the contract.