Research On The Influence Of Directors Appointed By Non-state-owned Shareholders On Illegal Information Disclosure Of State-owned Enterprises

Over the years,China’s capital market has developed strongly,but the frequent occurrence of some enterprise information disclosure violations,not only seriously hit investors’ confidence in investment,but also broke the orderly and healthy operation of the entire capital market.In addition,information disclosure violations have always been a classic research topic in the field of corporate governance,so it is of profound practical and theoretical significance to explore the influencing factors of corporate information disclosure violations.Under the background of the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises,the internal governance of state-owned enterprises has received unprecedented attention,further,many scholars have discussed whether non-state-owned shareholders can effectively play a governance role by appointing directors to state-owned enterprises.This paper attempts to non-state shareholders appointed director and the information disclosure violations in the same research framework,to explore the influence of directors appointed by non-state-owned shareholders on information disclosure violations of state-owned enterprises.Based on the background of mixed reform of state-owned enterprises,this paper takes the annual data of The Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed State-Owned enterprises from 2008 to 2019 as samples for empirical analysis,and uses empirical methods to verify the relationship between non-state-owned shareholders’ appointment of directors and state-owned enterprise information disclosure violations.In addition,group research is also carried out according to the level of internal control,external institutional environment,industry nature and administrative level.The results show that :(1)the proportion of directors appointed by non-state-owned shareholders is negatively correlated with the possibility of soe information disclosure violations,and also negatively correlated with the severity of information disclosure violations;(2)Compared with state-owned enterprises with high level of internal control,non-state-owned shareholders’ appointment of directors has a more significant inhibition effect on corporate information disclosure violations in state-owned enterprises with low level of internal control;(3)Compared with state-owned enterprises with poor external institutional environment,non-state-owned shareholders’ appointment of directors has a more significant inhibitory effect on corporate information disclosure violations in state-owned enterprises with better external institutional environment;(4)Compared with state-owned enterprises in monopolistic industries,non-state-owned shareholders’ appointment of directors has a more significant inhibitory effect on corporate information disclosure violations in competitive industries;(5)Compared with state-owned enterprises belonging to the central government,directors appointed by non-state-owned shareholders have a more significant inhibitory effect on information disclosure violations in local state-owned enterprises.This paper expands the relevant research on the influencing factors of enterprise information disclosure violations,provides strong empirical support for deepening the mixed reform of state-owned enterprises,and expects to help improve the internal governance of state-owned enterprises to some extent,and promote the healthy development of national economy.