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Research On Governance Effect Of Enterprise Financing From Shadow Banking

Posted on:2023-11-18Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:L DengFull Text:PDF
GTID:2539307070471344Subject:Accounting
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
The agency problem has always been the focus of academic attention,and it emerges one after another in China’s capital market.According to the existing research,it will be a good thing for enterprises to turn to the bank creditor’s rights governance mechanism represented by Germany and Japan to curb the agency problem.However,these studies only focus on the governance role of traditional creditor’s rights,which is not in line with the development of China’s financial practice.Especially in recent years,under the influence of the "deleveraging" policy,the scale of China’s shadow banks has flourished and exceeded 10 billions by the beginning of 2017,which means that shadow banks have become an important choice for enterprise financing.Simultaneous interpreting,can shadow banking funds play a role of governance like traditional debts?Based on this,this paper first combs the relevant literature of shadow banking,agency problem and debt governance effect,and theoretically demonstrates the relationship between shadow banking funds and two types of agency costs with the help of asymmetric information theory.On this basis,we select A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2013 to 2019 as the research sample,take the management fee rate and other receivables rate as the first and second forms of agency costs respectively,and use OLS method for empirical analysis.The research finds that shadow banking funds can reduce the two types of agency costs and play a significant governance role.In addition,further analysis found that shadow banking funds can inhibit inefficient investment;In non-state-owned enterprises,shadow banking funds has a stronger inhibitory effect on the second type of agency cost,while in state-owned enterprises,shadow banking funds has a stronger inhibitory effect on the first type of agency cost;Financing constraints,internal control and the degree of marketization will weaken the governance effect of shadow banking funds;The overseas background of the senior management team strengthens the governance effect of shadow banking funds.While enriching the relevant research,the article can provide an important reference for the formulation and implementation of shadow banking related policies.
Keywords/Search Tags:Shadow Banking Funds, Governance Effect, Two Kinds of Agency Cost
PDF Full Text Request
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