Research On Incentive Mechanism Of Third-party Remediation And Collusion Prevention Of Legacy Contamination Sites Left By Closed Enterprises

With the strengthening of ecological environmental control,a large number of polluting enterprises in the environmentally sensitive areas have been shut down and transferred.As a result,many polluting sites are left behind,which occupy a lot of land resources with high safety risks.Only after ecological restoration of the polluted sites can the sites be developed and reused.Under the requirement of taking full link for pollution control,in order to eliminate the lack of willingness of the closed enterprises to control pollution,the territorial government enhances the enthusiasm of the closed enterprises to control the remaining pollution through "severe punishment" of the pollution behavior.On the other hand,by introducing the third party to participate in pollution control,the cost of ecological restoration is reduced and the lack of pollution control ability of the closed enterprises in the pollution control of the polluted site is made up.However,how the territorial government should set up reward and punishment contracts for enterprises,so as to encourage enterprises to actively participate in pollution control tasks,and prevent collusion between enterprises caused by information asymmetry between government and enterprises,are all problems that need to be studied to break through the current dilemma of the treatment of contamination sites left by closed enterprises.Therefore,on the basis of the existing research,this paper first clarified the game relationship between relevant subjects,built the incentive benchmark model for the third-party governance of the closed enterprises’ contaminated sites based on the principal-agent theory,and explored the optimal incentive contract and the influence of various parameters on the decision-making of the subject.Secondly,considering the information asymmetry between government and enterprises,there may be collusion between the closure enterprises and the ecological restoration enterprises,a third-party governance incentive model considering collusion is constructed,and the influence of collusion on the incentive model is studied by comparative analysis.Finally,this paper studies the prevention of collusion behavior of enterprises,explores the role of existing incentive mechanism in collusion prevention,and introduces public participation to further improve the current mechanism to enhance the effectiveness of collusion prevention.The research conclusions of this paper mainly include:(1)About the optimal incentive contract for the third party treatment of the closed contaminated sites left by enterprises: Firstly,for the closed enterprises,the incentive coefficient of the closed enterprises to the ecological restoration enterprises’ pollution control efforts is positively correlated with the rewards and punishments of the territorial government to the closed enterprises,and negatively correlated with the marginal cost of the ecological restoration enterprises’ efforts,the risk avoidance coefficient,the rewards and punishments of the territorial government to the ecological restoration enterprises and the external random factors in the pollution control process.The incentive coefficient of closed enterprises to the technological improvement efforts of ecological restoration enterprises is negatively correlated with the marginal cost of ecological restoration enterprises’ efforts,the risk avoidance coefficient and the external random factors in the improvement process.Secondly,for ecological restoration enterprises,their efforts in pollution control are negatively correlated with their marginal cost,risk avoidance coefficient and external random factors in pollution control,and positively correlated with the rewards and punishments given to them and the closed enterprises by the territorial government.The technological improvement efforts of ecological restoration enterprises are negatively correlated with their marginal cost,risk avoidance coefficient and external random factors in the process of technological improvement.Finally,for the territorial government,the intensity of rewards and punishments for closed enterprises is positively correlated with the marginal effort cost,risk avoidance coefficient,ecological restoration standard and external random factors in the pollution control process.(2)About the influence of collusion between enterprises on the third party governance of the polluted sites left by the closed enterprises: First,the variables under the consideration of collusion are in the same direction as the correlation between the incentive intensity of the closed enterprises and the ecological restoration enterprises;Secondly,when considering the collusion among enterprises,the pollution control efforts of ecological restoration enterprises are positively correlated with the degree of collusion among enterprises.The degree of collusion between enterprises is positively correlated with the intensity of rewards and punishments given to the two enterprises by the territorial government,and negatively correlated with the marginal cost of enterprise remediation efforts,the degree of risk avoidance,the intensity of collusion punishment,and the external random factors in the pollution control process.Thirdly,compared with the situation without considering collusion,collusion behavior only improves the income of the closed enterprise when the pollution control cost is at a relatively low level,while only improves the income of the closed enterprise when the pollution control cost is at a relatively high level.However,it will lead to the reduction of the efforts of the restoration enterprises,the incentive intensity of the closure enterprises to the ecological restoration enterprises,the income of the ecological restoration enterprises and the total social welfare.However,no matter what the governance cost is,the collusion behavior will lead to the reduction of government income and bring huge financial pressure to the government,which also requires the prevention of the collusion behavior among enterprises.(3)About the prevention of collusion between enterprises in the third-party governance of the closed enterprises’ polluted sites: In the governance task of the closed enterprises’ polluted sites,the deterministic equivalent income of the risk-averse ecological restoration enterprises is the same in the case of collusion and non-collusion,which indicates that the restoration enterprises do not actively seek collusion.As for collusion between enterprises,the setting of reward and punishment intensity of territorial government and the adjustment of collusion punishment coefficient can only play a role in preventing collusion when some parameters are within a certain period of a specific range.Introducing public participation supervision directly related to contaminated sites to improve the incentive mechanism can play an effective role in reducing the degree of collusion between enterprises.