| The climate issue is a common challenge for human society.In 2020,our government proposed the goal of carbon peaking by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060.To reach this goal,the government is imposing higher emission reduction requirements on high carbon emitting enterprises.Due to the high cost of investment in emission reduction,it is difficult to increase the motivation of all parties in society to participate if there is no effective capital incentive mechanism.As an important way to achieve the "double carbon" target,carbon quota trading can effectively promote the participation of all parties in carbon quota trading and achieve the goal of carbon emission reduction by coordinating the supply and demand relationship between manufacturers and suppliers through market trading.Therefore,in the context of the current "dual carbon" policy,it is of great theoretical and practical significance to analyze the relationship between the government,manufacturers and suppliers in carbon quota trading,and to explore the factors affecting the evolution of their strategies.Firstly,based on the background that there are two trading paths of carbon quota trading: internal and external,this paper analyzes and compares the results of carbon quota trading mechanism research,carbon quota trading path research and supply chain evolution game research,and elaborates on the concept of evolution game theory and system dynamics simulation.On the basis of defining the basic concept of emissiondependent supply chain,combining the characteristics of emission-dependent supply chain,and addressing the limitations of incomplete information and complete rationality in the actual game,evolutionary game theory is introduced to establish a two-sided evolutionary game model in which manufacturers choose emission reduction strategies and suppliers choose trading paths from the perspective of carbon allowance trading.The equilibrium point of the two-party evolutionary game model composed of manufacturers and suppliers is obtained by replicating the dynamic equations,and the local stability of the equilibrium point under the two-party evolutionary game is analyzed by using the Jaconbian matrix to explore the influence of three factors,namely,in-chain transaction cost,off-chain transaction cost and carbon allowance purchase ratio,on the path of the two-party evolutionary game of manufacturers-suppliers,and then the path of the two-party evolutionary game and the parameters are revealed by numerical simulation.sensitivity.Second,since government regulation can restrain the carbon emission reduction behavior of the supply chain,based on the above two-party evolutionary game model,the benefits and costs of government regulation are considered,and the government is introduced as the third party to build a three-party evolutionary game model of government regulation,manufacturers’ emission reduction and suppliers’ choice of trading path.The equilibrium point of the three-party evolutionary game model consisting of government,manufacturers and suppliers is obtained by replicating the dynamic equations,and the local stability of the equilibrium point under the three-party evolutionary game is analyzed by using the Jaconbian matrix.Due to the complex relationship between parameters in the three-party evolutionary game,in order to visualize the relationship between parameters,the causal loop diagram and the stock flow diagram among factors are constructed by applying the system dynamics theory to obtain the causal diagram of the government-manufacturer-supplier evolutionary game,and explore the influence of excess carbon emissions,in-chain trading subsidies and off-chain trading gains on the stabilization strategy of the three-party evolutionary game.The simulation reveals the evolutionary paths and parameter sensitivities of the three parties.Finally,we summarize the research results of this paper in three aspects: carbon allowance trading path,supply chain carbon emission reduction game model and evolutionary game analysis.By analyzing the evolutionary game path of two-party game and three-party game,we give key influencing factors and management insights on the evolutionary stabilization strategy,and point out the future research directions for reference. |
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