Research On Supply Chain Financing And Operation Strategy Under Carbon Cap And Trading Mechanism

At the 75th United Nations General Assembly,my country put forward the goal of reaching the peak and carbon neutrality.The "Dual-Carbon Target" will bring profound changes to China’s economic structure and operation,and further expand the scope of environmental supervision from high-pollution industries to high-emission industries.The "Dual-Carbon Target" will accelerate the transformation and upgrading of the manufacturing industry chain.Under the requirements of low-carbon development,enterprises are not only important players in promoting national economic development,but also key players in achieving the "dual carbon goals",especially for energyintensive industries with high carbon emissions,such as power generation,papermaking,and building materials.Under this circumstance,enterprises have to consider the regulation of carbon emissions in the process of development.Moreover,with the gradual enhancement of people’s low-carbon awareness,production and emission reduction has gradually attracted the attention of enterprises.However,investment in emission reduction needs funds,and financial constraints have been a problem for many enterprises,especially for carbon emission dependent small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises.Based on the above background,this paper considers carbon regulation and constructs a capital constrained supply chain financing and operation decision-making model.Based on the Stackelberg game framework,the model constructs a low-carbon supply chain composed of manufacturers and retailers.Among them,retailers are game leaders,and the manufacturer with financial constraints and external carbon emission regulation is the game follower to bear the inventory risk of the supply chain.Manufacturers have two financing channels: one is the external bank financing mode.The second is the investment and financing mode of retailers,trading partners of the supply chain.the equilibrium solution of retailers and manufacturers under specific financing mode is deduced through reverse inductive analysis,and the corresponding conclusions are obtained combined with numerical analysis.The research obtains the manufacturer’s financing preference within a certain parameter range.When the consumer’s low-carbon preference coefficient is high or the initial capital is large,trade credit financing performed better,and the retailer is also willing to provide advance payment and investment financing.Then,based on the above model,the cost sharing mechanism is considered in our paper,the financing strategy and operation decision of supply chain under cost sharing are analyzed,and draws a certain conclusion in combination with the numerical analysis method.It is found that the cost sharing contract is consistent with the supply chain operation strategy under the two financing modes.The higher the retailer’s emission reduction cost sharing rate,the higher the manufacturer’s optimal emission reduction level and optimal production,and the wholesale price provided by the retailer is lower than that without cost sharing.Under trade credit financing,in supply chain coordination,the wholesale price of products decided by retailers increases with the increase of investment interest rate,and the optimal wholesale price decreases with the increase of cost sharing rate provided by retailers.Under the reasonable cost sharing rate,the profits of manufacturers and retailers increase,and Pareto improvement can be realized.