Research On The Design Of Wastewater Treatment Outsourcing Contract Based On Bilateral Responsibilities

The third-party governance of environmental pollution has aroused great attention from the Party Central Committee and state leaders and widespread attention from all walks of life.The current State Council stipulations clearly stipulate that the pollutant discharge unit shall bear the main responsibility for pollution control and the third party shall bear the responsibility for control.Although the government has stipulated the standards for the division of responsibilities,it is found through literature and field research that in the implementation of the existing entrusted pollution control contracts,the division of responsibilities between the pollutant discharge enterprises and the pollution control enterprises still has post-accident disputes,buck-passing,contract breaches,and incomplete contract provisions.Covering actual emergencies,etc.,these events highlight the challenges and risks of multiple parties sharing responsibility for environmental pollution control.Inspired by field research,this study explores the problem of compensation after environmental pollution accidents,which is common in sewage treatment outsourcing,but there is little literature research.In this paper,the sewage treatment service is modeled as a collaborative service,and the service quality is reflected in the accident probability,which is jointly determined by the contract performance degree of the pollutant discharge enterprise and the pollution control enterprise.This paper attempts to answer the following two questions: in different situations such as the entrusted operation of special pollution control facilities and the centralized pollution control of industrial parks,how to design the accident penalty sharing mechanism of pollution control outsourcing contracts to encourage both parties to invest resources in different links to coordinate pollution control and achieve A win-win for both parties? Under the third-party pollution control model,how to reasonably design the environmental accident punishment mechanism,guide the reasonable investment of both pollution discharge and pollution control,and reduce the total social cost?is closer to the optimal centralized decision-makingThe main research work is as follows: First,for the scenario of the entrusted operation of special pollution control facilities,based on the given government environmental protection supervision rules,two types of bilateral responsibility contracts for the commissioned operation of special pollution control facilities are designed,and the two types of contracts are compared and analyzed.Governing the effect of joint pollution control by both parties.Research shows that threshold-based liability contracts outperform liability contracts based on fixed indemnity ratios.Compared with a liability contract based on a fixed compensation ratio,it can achieve a smaller total cost of pollution control,and the performance level of both pollutant discharge and pollution control parties.When the government does not impose non-economic penalties on polluting enterprises,the threshold-based liability contract can achieve the optimal centralized decision-making.Secondly,for the scenario of centralized pollution control in industrial parks,based on the given government environmental protection supervision rules,considering the mutual influence between polluting enterprises and causing additional accident risks,two types of bilateral liability contracts under centralized pollution control in industrial parks are designed.Research shows that under the centralized pollution control of industrial parks,the performance of liability contracts based on thresholds is still better than that based on fixed compensation ratios,and can achieve a smaller total cost of pollution control.At the same time,the greater the degree of influence among polluting enterprises,the greater the total cost of additional projects and the total accident probability generated by the threshold-based liability contract compared to the optimal centralized decision-making.When the government does not impose non-economic penalties on polluting enterprises,the threshold-based liability contract Centralized decision-making can be achieved optimally.Finally,the punishment mechanism design of environmental accidents under the third-party sewage treatment mode is studied.In view of the entrusted operation of special pollution control facilities and the centralized pollution control in the park,how does the government choose the post-accident punishment mechanism under the sewage outsourcing management mode,so that the total social cost of sewage outsourcing management is minimized.The research shows that when the government chooses the post-accident punishment mechanism for pollution control outsourcing for the commissioned operation of special pollution control facilities and the centralized pollution control in the park,when the pollution control outsourcing market is dominated by pollution control companies and does not consider the ability of the pollution discharge companies to pay for economic penalties.The government does not need to impose non-economic penalties on both pollutant dischargers and pollution control parties,but only needs to impose constraints on pollution control enterprises.The government imposes non-economic penalties on pollution control companies,and pollution control companies can transfer the pressure brought by constraints to pollution control companies through contracts.If the post-accident punishment selected by the government is higher,then the dedicated pollution control facilities are commissioned to operate,and the industrial parks are centralized in pollution control.