Research On The Allocation Of Attention In The Process Of Cooperation Between Local Governments And International Environmental NGO

Effective cooperation between local government and international environmental NGO,as a way to improve and promote ecological environmental governance performance,is of positive significance to promote the modernization of ecological environmental governance system and governance capacity.The distribution of local governments’ attention to cooperation will affect the effect of cooperation to a certain extent.At the same time,the allocation of government attention is also a theoretical issue that academics pay increasing attention to.Therefore,exploring the allocation of attention in cooperation between local governments and international environmental NGO is of great value to promote effective cooperation between local governments and international environmental NGO and to enrich and improve theoretical research on the allocation of attention by local governments.At present,the influential factors of local government’s attention allocation mainly include policy attribute,task attribute,principal authority,external pressure,government hierarchy,bureaucracy rules,bureaucratic interests,accountability pressure and promotion incentive,but little attention is paid to the influence of the members as the dominated ones.In this study,Bureau M and Bureau N,responsible for forestry management in two county governments in Northeast China,cooperated with an international environmental NGO to carry out an anti-poaching project as a case.Through the case comparison method,it was found that the difference of members’ political capital in Bureau M and Bureau N is the key factor affecting the different allocation of attention between Bureau M and Bureau N to the cooperation.On the basis of the dialogue with Giddens’ "resource-dominance" theory and the attention allocation theory,the attention allocation logic of Bureau M and Bureau N in this cooperation is deeply analyzed,so as to conclude the influence of members’ political capital on the attention allocation of local government and construct an analytical framework of "members’ political capital-dominance mode-dominance effect-attention distribution".Since the two cases of Bureau M and Bureau N have strong typicality,they can concentrate on reflecting the two types of local government that most members have political capital and most members have no political capital.Therefore,the influence of member’s political capital on local government’s attention allocation summarized based on these two cases has a certain extrapolation,which can provide certain reference and guidance for the general level of local government attention allocation research.The study concluded that In the situation of weak promotion incentive,weak accountability pressure and weak task,when most junior members of a government organization have political capital,the authoritative resource advantage of the manager is weakened,so the way of induction-type domination rather than command-type domination is mainly adopted to mobilize the subordinate members to carry out the project task.However,in the case of induced failure,it is difficult for the manager to effectively control the subordinate members to carry out the project task,which leads to the attenuated attention to the project task.When most junior members of a government organization do not have political capital,managers have obvious advantages in authoritative resources,so they mainly use command-type domination supplemented by induction-type domination to effectively control subordinate members to actively execute project task,so as to promote the formation of sustained attention to the project task.