Study On Credit Rating Of Defaulted Bonds

In recent years,the number and amount of corporate bond defaults have increased,causing market attention to the credit rating of defaulted bonds.Due to the consideration of market stability factors,rating agencies are very cautious about credit rating downgrade.Some bond credit ratings were not downgraded before the bond default,but the extent of downgrade was too large afterwards,leading to bond investors to question the role of credit rating in risk identification and risk disclosure in the process of bond default.This dissertation takes the credit rating problem of Yongtai Energy bond default as a case.By analyzing the causes of the problems of inflated credit rating,delayed adjustment,unreasonable adjustment and imperfect rating supervision in the default of Yongtai Energy bonds,this dissertation finds that the credit rating problems exposed by the default of Yongtai Energy bonds have certain commonality,and the credit rating of domestic defaulted bonds all have inflated credit rating,delayed rating adjustment and rating supervision problems.Through the analysis of information asymmetry theory,transaction cost theory and game theory,it is found that the market competition among rating agencies is the main reason for the inflated credit rating.Rating agencies undertake the responsibility of maintaining market stability.They are more cautious in downgrading issuers’ ratings than in upgrading them,and the credit rating tracking is not timely,which are the main reasons for the delayed rating adjustment.The rating industry is regulated by many parties,the supervision system overlaps partially,and the punishment for the violation of the rating agencies is low,which is the reason for the above behavior of the rating agencies.In view of the inflated rating caused by vicious competition among rating agencies,it is suggested to reform the payment mechanism,adopt advance payment and introduce third-party payment mode,improve the reputation cost of credit rating agencies,and improve the internal governance of rating agencies.In view of the problem of rating adjustment,it is suggested to weaken the role of credit rating,strengthen tracking rating,improve the effectiveness and foresight of tracking rating,and learn from implied rating to improve the timeliness of rating adjustment.In view of the supervision of rating agencies,it is suggested to improve the punishment mechanism,establish a unified law enforcement mechanism,strengthen investor protection,and crack down on malicious evasion of debts.In summary,this dissertation takes Yongtai Energy bond in the event of default credit rating as a case,the information asymmetry theory,transaction cost theory and game theory,analysis the bond credit rating in artificially high,rating adjustments and rating regulatory issues,in-depth study the forming reason of these problems and puts forward the corresponding Suggestions.This dissertation enrichs the research content of credit rating and helps to promote the reform and development of rating industry.There are 9 figures,18 tables and 63 references in this dissertation.