A Study On The Policy Incentives And Regulatory Constraints Strategies Of Green Bond Issuance Market Rating Agencies

Amid China’s goals for Emission peak and Carbon neutrality,green bonds have emerged as a key tool for carbon reduction.As China’s green bond market grows,its evaluation process,influenced by external factors specific to green bonds,has become more complex than traditional bonds.This complexity has led to inaccuracies like inflated ratings and “green washing”.The study aims to enhance the accuracy of green bond ratings by integrating differentiated policies,considering the reputation of rating agencies,and incorporating regulatory measures.By employing various non-cooperative game models,this research delves deep into the rating mechanisms of green bonds and the effects of different policies.By factoring in the environmental benefits of the financed projects,the study examines the applications and outcomes of two green bond rating mechanisms.Overall,the research seeks to improve China’s green bond market policies,rating evaluation methods,and regulatory effectiveness.The main research content is divided into the following four parts:Firstly,recognizing the separation of rating evaluations and regulatory supervision in China’s green bond market,we analyze two core games within a dual-rating regulatory framework: the interplay between green evaluation agencies and green bond committees,and the interaction between credit rating agencies and securities regulatory bodies.The impact of varying government fiscal incentives and regulatory measures on rating strategies is explored through game analysis and numerical simulations.Results suggest that early enhancement of government fiscal incentives can,to an extent,uplift the likelihood of impartial evaluation of green bonds by rating agencies,albeit possibly elevating regulatory costs.Meanwhile,stringent regulatory penalties help avert inappropriate evaluations by rating entities and decrease regulatory costs.Notably,when fiscal incentives remain neutral,augmenting sporadic supervisory checks significantly influences green bond ratings,more so than reinforcing regulatory penalties..Secondly,considering the asymmetry between government incentives and regulatory constraints in China’s green bond market,this study refines and constructs a four-player replicator dynamic evolutionary game model under a dual-rating evaluation mechanism.Emphasizing the interaction between evaluation agencies and supervisory regulatory bodies,we aim to deeply understand the influence of decision-making mechanisms on the quality of rating evaluations and regulatory effectiveness.Through game analysis,simulations,and empirical research,we investigate the impact of differentiated fiscal incentives and regulatory constraints on rating quality.Findings indicate that single strict regulatory constraints can markedly improve rating evaluation accuracy in a stable green bond market development phase.In contrast,symmetric incentive-constraint policies come second,while single fiscal incentive policies are relatively weak.Thirdly,considering the asymmetry between government incentives and regulatory constraints in China’s green bond market,this study refines and constructs a four-player replicator dynamic evolutionary game model under a dual-rating evaluation mechanism.Emphasizing the interaction between evaluation agencies and supervisory regulatory bodies,we aim to deeply understand the influence of decision-making mechanisms on the quality of rating evaluations and regulatory effectiveness.Through game analysis,simulations,and empirical research,we investigate the impact of differentiated fiscal incentives and regulatory constraints on rating quality.Findings indicate that single strict regulatory constraints can markedly improve rating evaluation accuracy in a stable green bond market development phase.In contrast,symmetric incentive-constraint policies come second,while single fiscal incentive policies are relatively weak.Finally,the environmental benefits of green bonds are detailed into direct and indirect benefits,separating their distinct impacts on dual-rating and integrated rating evaluation mechanisms.Coupled with the reputational capital of green bond rating agencies and the core factor of regulatory punitive costs,we further refine and establish a two-stage differentiated incentive-constraint Hotelling game model.Through numerical simulations,we intensively explore the applicability conditions and regulatory outcomes of these two evaluation mechanisms.Our results show that under an imbalanced rating accuracy scenario with both types of environmental benefits being substantial,the dual-rating evaluation mechanism proves superior.Conversely,with both benefits being minimal,the integrated rating evaluation mechanism emerges as more effective.When rating accuracy is balanced,and both benefits reach specific values,the results align with the imbalanced scenario.