Strategy Update Rules Based On Individual Historical Payoffs

Cooperative behavior is prevalent in human society and nature.It plays a crucial role in human development.How to explain the prevalence of cooperative behavior among selfish individuals is challenging.Evolutionary game theory provides a powerful theoretical framework for studying such cooperative behavior.Many evolutionary game mechanisms have contributed to understanding the evolution of cooperation.Especially,the spatial mechanism has provided new ideas to further study cooperative emergence.The research work in this paper discusses the evolutionary features of cooperation based on the spatial prisoner’s dilemma game.The main research contents are the following.First,we introduce a new update rule in which individuals make decisions according to their historical performance in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game on a square lattice.Comparing our results with the Prisoner’s Dilemma experiment,such an update rule can explain the experiment well.It suggests that this update rule may be useful for understanding the behavior of individuals in the experiment.Importantly,we can use this rule to explain the moody conditional cooperation.Second,we discuss the effect of individual rationality on the evolution of cooperation in stationary state.Finally,we discuss the effect of dilemma strength on the evolution of cooperation.