Research On Consensus Decision-Making Considering Individual Effort From The Perspective Of Game Theory

In the process of considering the game consensus of compensation cost,decision-makers need to make efforts to adjust their inconsistent opinions,and the individual effort is affected by the amount of compensation provided by the moderator.However,the existing optimization consensus model ignores individual effort and the corresponding effort costs of decision-makers when adjusting their opinions.In addition,most consensus models have an implicit assumption:the decision-makers and coordinators are completely rational.However,in some practical problems,decision-makers are not completely selfish,and also consider the utility of the moderator,that is,there is altruistic preference behavior.At the same time,the moderator does not have unlimited compromise on the extent of upward/downward adjustments made by decision-makers,that is,there is compromise limits behavior.In order to solve the above problems,the main work of this paper is as follows:(1)We first construct a consensus model based on game theory to consider individual effort.And then,the impact of individual effort on consensus results is studied from the perspective of interactive game between decision-makers and the moderator.The perceived utility function of individual effort is defined.In order to obtain the optimal adjustment strategy of each decision-maker,a feedback adjustment mechanism considering individual effort is constructed.Then,a game based two-level consensus model is proposed,and the particle swarm optimization algorithm is used to solve the model to obtain the optimal compensation strategy of the moderator.(2)Considering the altruistic preference of decision-makers and the compromise limits of the moderator.This paper constructs the utility function of the moderator and the perceived utility function of each decision-maker considering altruistic preference respectively.In this process,with the increase of consensus threshold,the decision-makers always tend to have smaller collective opinion.In order to improve the collective opinion,the moderator does not make unlimited compromise on the extent of upward/downward adjustment of decision-makers’ opinions.The compromise limits of the moderator are introduced into the consensus model.Finally,taking the carbon emission reduction of the supply chain as the application background,the validity of the proposed model is verified through numerical analysis and sensitivity analysis.Through the research of this paper,we get some conclusions,in order to provide theoretical value for the minimum cost consensus problem.(1)When only considering each decision-maker’s individual effort,the change of the individual effort increases with the scope of his/her adjustment opinion.When considering the decision-maker’s altruistic preference on this basis,the individual effort is also related to the compensation cost provided by the moderator;(2)The increase of unit compensation cost will not necessarily enhance decision makers’ willingness to adjust,but the increase of unit effort cost will definitely significantly reduce decision makers’ efforts;(3)Consensus cost tends to increase with the increase of altruistic preference coefficient or the decrease of limited compromise threshold.However,when the decision-maker changes to full altruism,consensus cost will have a downward turning point.Therefore,the moderator should formulate a reasonable compensation strategy to include the effort cost and altruistic preference behavior of the decision-maker,which can promote the decision-makers to accept the suggestions and urge the moderator to save final consensus cost.