Research On Strategies Of Several Retrial Queueing Systems With Constant Retrial Rate

Based on the queueing game theory,we establish three different models in the context of the COVID-19 epidemic,and studies the equilibrium strategies under different information levels.Firstly,in this thesis,we summarize the development and research status of queueing game theory and retrial queues,and introduces the basic theory and principle of queueing game theory in detail.Secondly,on the basis of the constant retrial queueing system,we consider that the server could encounter catastrophes during the working period.Once a catastrophe arrives,customers are forced to leave the system,and the server will be fixed immediately.During the repair time,customers are not allowed to join the system.The discussion of individual equilibrium strategy and socially optimal strategy is based on two cases: in the fully observable case,the server adopts a state-dependent service policy and in the partially unobservable case,the service rate is constant.Thirdly,we consider the retrial queueing system with constant retrial rate and catastrophes,and during the repair time,customers are allowed to join the system.We study equilibrium strategies under two information levels.Fourthly,based on the above research,a delayed vacation strategy is adopted,we derive the equilibrium strategy in the fully observable case and the steady-state condition of the system in the fully unobservable case.Lastly,according to the above research,numerical examples are used to analyze the effects of some important parameters.For the constant retrial queueing system with catastrophes and state-dependent service rates,with the increase of the arrival rate of catastrophes,customers are more inclined to join the system when it is in the partially unobservable case.