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Research On Improper Marketing Supervision Strategy Of Online Webcast Marketing On Evolutionary Game

Posted on:2023-10-06Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:R J MiaoFull Text:PDF
GTID:2530306620485374Subject:Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
Since the first year of network webcast marketing in 2016,online network webcast marketing has developed in a blowout fashion.Under the condition of the normalization of the epidemic,the advantages of network webcast marketing are becoming more and more obvious.In the development of online economy in recent years,network webcast marketing,as a new engine of economic development,plays an increasingly important role in online economic development.However,behind the prosperity and development of network broadcast marketing,improper marketing problems have gradually been exposed,such as false publicity,data falsification and shoddy products in the process of network broadcast marketing.Improper marketing behaviors damage the rights and interests of consumers and lead to a crisis of trust in network webcast marketing,which is not conducive to the long-term benign development of network webcast marketing.Therefore,it is urgent to fully sort out the current situation of network webcast marketing,conduct research on improper marketing in network webcast marketing,and put forward relevant regulatory suggestions and strategies.Firstly,on the basis of sorting out the development,supervision status and relevant literature of live broadcast marketing,to consider only the host,platform,the relationship between the evolution of the game under the two main body,at the same time establish evolutionary game model,and analyze the evolutionary game situation on both sides,then introduce the consumer body,analyze the evolutionary game relationship tripartite,through the establishment of payoff matrix,computing replicated dynamic equation,Jacobi matrix,According to lyapunov’s first rule,the stability of equilibrium points is judged,the reasons for the formation of different equilibrium points are analyzed,and the comparative analysis of two-party and three-party evolutionary games is made.The results can be obtained :(1)the introduction of consumer subject will change the improper marketing status of anchors and improve the probability of real publicity of anchors,so it is necessary to consider the consumer subject.(2)The greater the punishment for improper marketing anchors and the higher the reward for real publicity anchors,the more favorable the real publicity of anchors will be,and the positive supervision of the platform will also be.(3)In the three-party evolutionary game,the existence of the opportunism of the live broadcast platform leads to the fact that the real propaganda of the host and the active supervision of the platform cannot become the evolutionary stable point.Then,on the basis of the three-way evolutionary game,the regulatory body is introduced.Firstly,the situation of the four-way evolutionary game is analyzed.Also,the payment matrix is established,the replication dynamics are calculated,the Jacobian matrix is calculated,and the stability of equilibrium point is judged according to Lyapunov’s first law.(1)The lower the extra income of improper anchor marketing,the more conducive to the healthy development of online webcast marketing.(2)Among the consumers who give up feedback improper marketing,the lower the proportion of consumers who give up feedback due to private compensation,the more beneficial the healthy development of network webcast marketing.(3)Under the active supervision of regulatory authorities,there is no stable strategy combination of active supervision by platforms.In other words,when platforms actively supervise,regulatory authorities can appropriately relax supervision.(4)Different from the two-party and three-party evolutionary game,if a regulatory agency is established,the regulatory agency needs to take responsibility and actively supervise and promote the steady development of online webcast marketing;It is counter-productive to have a regulator that is not actually accountable.Finally,based on the research and analysis,this paper proposes some regulatory strategies,such as broadening regulatory perspectives and perspectives,strengthening soft regulatory constraints,improving industry self-discipline,strengthening hard regulatory constraints,and improving relevant laws and regulations.Meanwhile,the shortcomings of this study are proposed and the prospects are put forward.
Keywords/Search Tags:network webcast, improper marketing, regulatory policy, evolutionary game, Lyapunov first Law improper publicity
PDF Full Text Request
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