Accounting Information Comparability,Accounting Information Quality And Managerial Myopia

Investment is one of the three important decisions of an enterprise,and the level of investment efficiency is a key factor affecting the future development of an enterprise and its operating performance.As one of the reasons for the inefficient investment of enterprises,managers' short-sightedness has also become a research topic of many scholars.The occurrence of short-sightedness of managers will affect the development speed of the enterprise,damage the accumulation of new capital and the growth of the enterprise,and reduce the competitive advantage of the future development of the enterprise,which will further cause the slow development of the industry and hinder the development and progress of the industry.As an important system in the field of corporate finance,the accounting system have a significant impact on the content and format of the company's accounting statements.The reflected accounting information is the key to the company's self-evaluation and evaluation with peer companies.Investment behavior has an impact.With the current international convergence of accounting standards,the research on the comparability of accounting information is also gradually increasing.The comparability of accounting information refers to the degree of similarity between the enterprise accounting information and other enterprise accounting information in the same industry.If the accounting information of companies in the industry is highly comparable,then the accounting information of the enterprise is easier to compare with other enterprises and provide more information to the outside world.much information.Unlike accounting information comparability,which can improve the amount of information,the quality of accounting information can affect whether the content that can be conveyed by accounting information is effective.At present,both the research on the comparability of accounting information and the quality of accounting information believe that accounting information can affect the information asymmetry,thereby alleviating the problems related to the investment and financing of enterprises,and helping the development of enterprises.Therefore,under this research background,this paper decides to study on the relationship between the three variables.This paper chooses principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory as the theoretical basis,and makes theoretical analysis and hypothetical deduction of the relationship between the three variables.Managers are more concerned about their own interests,while shareholders are more concerned about enterprise value.Their goals are fundamentally different,and there is a serious problem of information asymmetry,which makes managers more prone to moral hazard problems.Tendency to be shortsighted;on the other hand,there will also be adverse selection problems in investors and shareholders.In order to better evaluate the value of the company and the ability of managers,they pay more attention to the current operation of the company,which in turn produces short-sighted pressure on managers,resulting in managers becoming short-sighted.question.The accounting information can effectively avoid the situations of asymmetric accounting information,and suppress managers' myopia from the causes.Therefore,this paper puts forward the relevant hypothesis,that is,the comparability of accounting information can alleviate managers' myopia and accounting information.Quality can strengthen the negative effect between the two.Finally,A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2019 were selected as samples for empirical test to verify the hypothesis.This paper uses the short-term investment of enterprises and stock turnover rate to measure the short-sighted situation of managers,and uses the method of accounting information similarity generated by different enterprises to face the same economic events to measure the comparability of accounting information,and calculate the manipulative accruals calculated by Jones model.Items are used as proxy variables of accounting information quality,and the samples are divided into state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises.The results show that accounting information comparability can inhibit managerial myopia;the quality can enhance the inhibitory effect of comparability on managerial myopia;relative to state-owned enterprises,accounting information quality has a positive moderating effect in non-state-owned enterprises.The above research results deeply explore the relationship between accounting information comparability,accounting information quality and managerial shortsightedness,reveal the influence mechanism among the three,and improve the theoretical basis of managerial shortsightedness.First,from the perspective of accounting information,this paper supplements and improves the theoretical basis and logical framework for the research on managers' myopia and accounting information.Secondly,this paper supplements the research on accounting information comparability in the aspect of accounting information quality,and also increases the research on accounting information comparability on non-efficient investment,especially supplements the research content and related empirical results in the direction of managers' shortsightedness.Further research provides research ideas.At the same time,in the context of paying more and more attention to the long-term development of enterprises,the theoretical results of this paper will enhance the understanding and use of accounting information by enterprises,provide a new perspective for enterprise governance methods,fully stimulate the development potential of enterprises,and help enterprises develop in the future.