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Optimal Analysis Of Double Shareholding Structur

Posted on:2021-10-12Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:S J ZhouFull Text:PDF
GTID:2518306050982319Subject:Enterprise Economy
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In recent years,with the rapid development of China's economy at a rate of more than 6% per year,the investors in China's capital market are increasing day by day,and the overall quality of investment is constantly improving.At the same time,the scale of investment is also increasing.Investment has become an important part of our people's daily life.With the development of China's capital market,more and more enterprises choose to go public for financing.However,in the process of capital market financing in Chinese mainland,with the continuous financing of enterprises and dilution of the founder's equity,the founder may lose control of the enterprise,while the understanding of the outside major shareholders to the enterprise is far inferior to that of the founder,especially the high-tech enterprises.The lack of relevant technology and knowledge by the outside shareholders has a great impact on the development of the company,which has a great impact on the company.Development is not conducive.A large number of enterprises spend a lot of energy in the controversy of control.The emergence of dualclass share structure not only enables the founder to grasp the control of the company,but also allows the company to get the corresponding funds.But the dual-class share structure is not perfect,it brings corresponding problems.This paper takes millet company as an example to analyze the advantages and disadvantages of dual-class share structure.The dual ownership structure can solve the problem that the founder's control right of financing is weakened,protect the founder's control right in a certain time and condition,prevent the founder from falling into the competition for control right of the enterprise,and concentrate on the development of the enterprise.Companies with dualclass share structure can put the long-term interests of the company in a more important position,and will not sacrifice the company's better development because of short-term interests.As more and more companies adopt dual-class share structure,with the passage of time,these companies are about to face company changes in the near future.Then how should companies adopt double-tier ownership structure deal with the problems brought by the dual-class share structure? This paper puts forward its own ideas.This paper argues that the company should establish the exit mechanism and periodic evaluation system of the dual-class share structure.In order to prevent the actual controllers from making decisions that significantly damage the company's interests,the company should set certain conditions to trigger a vote of no confidence against the actual controllers,and decide whether to continue trusting the actual controllers or choose a new person to lead the company.
Keywords/Search Tags:Dual-class share structure, control power, corporate governance
PDF Full Text Request
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