The Impact Of Health Information Shocks On Commercial Health Insurance Purchases

Commercial health insurance is a significant type of insurance in our medical security system and it is also an important supplement to the basic medical security system.However,China's commercial health insurance is still at a relatively low level,lagging behind other developed countries.At the end of 2018,The proportion of China's commercial health insurance in the insurance industry's original insurance premium income had just exceeded 12.0%,while developed countries' commercial health insurance accounted for more than 30%.In 2018,the depth of China's commercial health insurance was 0.61% and the average global depth of insurance was 6.13%.The density of commercial health insurance is 390 yuan / person,and the global average level is 4,394 yuan / person.Although there are many reasons for China's commercial health insurance has not developed as expected,this article attempts to analyze it from the perspective of insufficient awareness of health risks.People's perception of their own health will have an impact on the purchase of commercial health insurance.Therefore,we try to introduce an external health information shock,observe the behavior and heterogeneity of purchasing commercial health insurance after being impacted by the impact of health information,and then further explore the problem of adverse selection in the commercial health insurance market and investigate whether people affected by the impact of health information are more likely to buy commercial health insurance.The specific content of this article are as follows: Chapters one are the background and theoretical research of this article.First of all,it explains the inadequacy of chronic diseases in Chinese residents and the current development of commercial health insurance.Then,introduce the research method of this article,and finally elaborates the innovation points of this article.The second chapter summarizes the literature of domestic and foreign scholars on the behavior of purchasing commercial health insurance and the impact of health information shocks and health risks on purchasing commercial health insurance.The third chapter is the measurement method and model construction.The main content is to build atheoretical framework,introduce the connotation of the regression discontinuity model,explore the endogenous problems,and pave the way for the empirical analysis in chapter 4.The fourth chapter is empirical analysis,which is the key chapter of this article.This section uses CHNS data,taking hypertension measurement readings as breakpoints(as a shock to health information)for empirical analysis.The research conclusions are as follows: First,the impact of health information will prompt people with health cognitive biases to purchase commercial health insurance.Second,the purchase of commercial health insurance has heterogeneity in income and work units.Groups with higher incomes are more likely to purchase commercial health insurance after being impacted by health information;compared to employees in formal units,flexible employees(such as individual households)are more likely to purchase commercial health insurance after being impacted by health information.Third,after being shock by health information,people with higher health risks purchase commercial health insurance more significantly,indicating that there is adverse selection in the commercial health insurance market.The last chapter is the summary.We propose measures for the commercial insurance market.This section analyzes the existing commercial health insurance policies in China and discusses the governance measures of adverse selection.The measures proposed are as follows.First,strengthen commercial health insurance knowledge promotion and popularization of risk prevention awareness,increase consumer awareness of health risks,and expand market space.Second,strengthen the pre-screening of chronic diseases such as hypertension and increase investment in early screening services.Third,insurance companies should improve the risk classification mechanism of the health insurance market,improve the insurance company's risk underwriting system,and strictly control the insured groups.