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Dual-channel Pricing And Service Strategies Considering Power Structures

Posted on:2021-12-29Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:C M WuFull Text:PDF
GTID:2510306512988119Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
With the development of the Internet economy,many companies have opened their own channels on the Internet,while still maintaining a cooperative relationship with offline retailers,forming a dual-channel supply chain structure.In the dual-channel supply chain,on the one hand,the market competition is fierce,and the power status of supply chain members often changes.On the other hand,with the rise of the service economy,consumers hope to enjoy good services in the process of consumption.The manufacturer and the retailer have their own channel advantages when providing value-added services to consumers.Therefore,considering the influence of channel member power structure and value-added services in the dual-channel supply chain on the optimal decision-making of supply chain members is a worthwhile research direction.This paper considers three typical channel power structures(Manufacturer-Stackelberg,Retailer-Stackelberg,and Nash Equilibrium),with different service modes(the retailer provides services(R-mode),the manufacturer provides services(M-mode),both parties provide services(MR mode))establishing corresponding game models and then conducting targeted researches.Finally,we get the following important conclusions:First,considering the pricing power,the study found that pricing power has an important impact on the optimal decision-making of supply chain members: both the manufacturer and the retailer want to be the Stackelberg leader to obtain more profits.The research has also found that the value-added service level provided by members of the supply chain remains stable and robust regardless of the power structure.Second,considering the service mode,for the retailer,she always prefers the service monopoly mode(R mode)of providing services by herself.But it's not for the manufacturer.When the service efficiency of the manufacturer is relatively high,he prefers the service monopoly mode(M mode).On the contrary,he prefers the joint service mode(MR mode).Finally,considering the total profits of the supply chain,the study found that the supply chain has a higher total profits in the equilibrium power than the Manufacturer-Stackelberg and the Retailer-Stackelberg.Further,the maximum total profits of the supply chain achieved in two situations: the manufacturer has a service advantage and he provides the service,or the manufacturer has no service advantage but the service is provided by the manufacturer and the retailer.The research results of this paper can enrich the dual-channel management theory,and at the same time provide corresponding theoretical models and decision support for enterprises to develop dual-channel sales.
Keywords/Search Tags:dual-channel, power structure, value-added service, game theory
PDF Full Text Request
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