The Change Of Enterprise Value Under The Founder’s Social Capital Participating In The Control Game

With the rapid development of China’s economy,all kinds of small and medium-sized enterprises continue to rise.While enterprises are developing and growing,they will inevitably absorb capital injections from foreign investors for financing needs.But with the addition of investors,the founder’s equity has been continuously diluted,and control will be threatened accordingly.At this time,it is very likely that a control game between the founder and the investor will occur,which will trigger a change in the value of the enterprise.This paper mainly studies the changes in corporate value under the control game,and in the process of researching the control game,discovers the founder’s social capital,the main influencing factor of the control game,and then studies the founder’s social capital in the control game Afterwards,it analyzes the changes of corporate value under the game of control rights by the founders’ social capital.When studying the overall change of enterprise value under the control game,it mainly uses the stock price,Tobin Q value and comprehensive financial indicators return on net assets to reflect the change of enterprise value.Before analyzing the return on net assets,it analyzes the three financial indicators affecting the return on net assets respectively.In this study,this paper compares the changes of enterprise value during the game period of Rex lighting with the changes of enterprise value during the stable development of Rex lighting,and finds that there is an obvious fluctuation of enterprise value during the game period,and the change is related to the social capital intensity of the founders,Then it further studies the changes of enterprise value under the participation of Founder social capital.When studying the enterprise value under the participation of Founder social capital,it mainly uses the event research method to analyze the enterprise value in each event window period.The research shows that in the case of NVC Lighting,when the founder is"resigned" in the game,the value of the company appears to decrease.When the founder "returns" in the game,the value of the company appears to increase,but from the overall value From the perspective of changes,the positive effect is not enough to offset the negative effect.Therefore,the overall control game will lead to a decline in the value of the enterprise.Moreover,when the founder’s social capital is deep enough,although it helps to make up for the founder’s disadvantages in equity capital and help the founder win the control game,at this time,the change in corporate value under the control game will also become more intense..This research connects the founder’s social capital and the change of corporate value under the control power game for analysis,and the research perspective is innovative.The research results provide information on how founders and investors can maintain their due control rights in the enterprise,avoid the occurrence of control rights games,and how companies can maintain stable operations in the control rights games and avoid large fluctuations in corporate value.Some suggestions for reference.