| The The development of compulsory education is about the future of the country.In the context of the development of modern society,the principle and goal of compulsory education is to enable each school-age child to enjoy a relatively fair and quality education.At the current stage,China is still facing the important tasks of improving the quality of compulsory education development,improving school running conditions and ensuring school-age children’s enrollment,especially in poverty-stricken areas.At the same time,we must win the all-out battle against poverty,and face more realistic and policy issues and challenges.How to recognize and identify the difficulties and risks faced by the compulsory education guarantee in impoverished provinces and autonomous regions of our country has become an urgent research topic.This article will use this as a starting point for research.Compulsory education is inseparable from the guarantee of investment of financial funds.With the current development of compulsory education toward a more adequate and balanced goal,compulsory education is the common right of the central and local governments.Central transfer payment funds are still used in compulsory education funds in many poor provinces.Play a major role.Among them,in the context of the deepening of the division of fiscal powers and expenditure responsibilities between the central and local governments,the central government has provided direct protection for important transfers of affairs in many impoverished provinces and regions,while also providing indirect through general transfer payments financial support.This article takes 22 provinces in China including poor counties as research objects and defines the scope of research.First,on the basis of previous literature research,this article uses the theory of transfer payment functions and effects to demonstrate the public risks implicit in the transfer payment system in compulsory education guarantees,and then theoretically demonstrates that the poor provinces can be improved by adjusting and improving the transfer payment system.The feasibility of guarantee effect of district compulsory education.Further,this article uses a behavioral game model to demonstrate thatin the case of poor financial resources in poor provinces and regions,central transfer payments will also affect the investment guarantee results by changing the behavior of compulsory education investment in poor provinces and regions.Secondly,on the basis of reviewing the historical changes in the guarantee system of compulsory education in China,and analyzing the impact and effectiveness of current central transfer payments on compulsory education guarantees in impoverished provinces and regions based on the status quo,it is pointed out that compulsory education in impoverished provinces and regions still lacks guarantees Or to protect the problem of surplus,and on the basis of this,analyze some of the main factors that affect the guarantee of compulsory education in poor provinces and regions in combination with the actual situation.Furthermore,in order to verify the results of the previous theory and actual analysis,this paper uses the panel data of 22 provinces in 2015-2018,compared with the national panel model to further empirical analysis,and finds the following conclusions: First,the current central general transfer payment is coordinated to the poor provinces and regions.The marginal effect of income used for compulsory education expenditure is significantly greater than the marginal effect of self-owned fiscal revenue,that is,the "sticky fly paper" effect has been generated,which indicates that poor provinces and regions prefer general transfer payments in terms of investment in compulsory education.Secondly,compared with the regression results of the national panel data,general transfer payments in poor provinces and regions have a more significant stimulating effect on the overall expenditure on compulsory education than the urban and rural compulsory education guarantee funds and own fiscal revenue.On this basis,in order to specifically analyze the effectiveness of compulsory education guarantees in various provinces and autonomous regions,this paper uses the data of prefecture-level cities across the country in 2017 to analyze the extraction of compulsory education funding that significantly affects students at the municipal and provincial levels through a multilayer linear model(HLM)analysis.The cost factor of each province is derivedfrom the cost guarantee coefficient and cost guarantee gap value of each province,and it is found that although there are some provinces with safeguard surpluses,currently there are still a large number of compulsory education guarantee gaps in China’s poor provinces.Finally,this paper uses simple linear regression to analyze the correlation between various types of central transfer payments and the province’s protection gap,and analyzes the specific risks of current central transfer payments in compulsory education protection in the two provinces through the cases of Hunan and Sichuan Provinces..Furthermore,based on the qualitative description and quantitative analysis above,this article puts forward a series of specific suggestions on how to reform central transfer payments in the next step. |
