Research On Anti-monopoly Law Regulation Of Algorithm Collusion

With the development of Internet technology,algorithms emerge as the times require.While improving market efficiency and promoting enterprise innovation,algorithms may also lead to collusion problems,which have the risk of eliminating and limiting competition.Algorithm collusion behavior is a kind of collusion behavior achieved by using algorithms,which is mainly manifested in two types: explicit algorithm collusion behavior and implicit algorithm collusion behavior.Based on the current regulatory situation of algorithmic collusion in various countries,there are common difficulties such as difficulty in identifying algorithmic collusion,difficulty in applying the same principle,difficulty in determining its illegality,backward anti-monopoly regulatory technology,etc.,resulting in the lack of explanatory power in the regulatory framework of traditional anti-monopoly law.Therefore,it is necessary to sort out and analyze the types of algorithmic conspiracies currently produced and put forward specific and feasible regulatory schemes.After clarifying the concept of algorithmic collusion,and distinguishing from traditional collusion and algorithmic discriminatory behavior,the algorithm’s specific role in collusion is used as a standard.The explicit collusion behavior includes messenger collusion and axonal collusion.Behaviours include predictive collusion and autonomous collusion.Judging from the current status of antitrust regulations in various countries,China’s regulation of algorithmic collusion has the following difficulties: First,it is difficult to identify algorithmic collusion.Mode;implied algorithmic collusion is achieved by issuing signals,lacking a clear meaning link.Second,the collusion behavior of explicit and implicit algorithms has different restrictions on competition in the market,and it is difficult to apply the same principle for regulation.Third,the cross-vertical relationship of explicit algorithmic collusion is difficult to be incorporated into the "dichotomy framework";the realization of implied algorithmic collusion does not require human consultation,which invalidates structural evidence and effectively determines the illegality of collusion.Fourth,the algorithm is highly specialized and hidden,and it is difficult for China’s anti-monopoly regulation technology to effectively regulate it.After studying the relevant theories of anti-monopoly law,this paper finds that the welfare analysis theory and the anti-monopoly regulation principle provide the theoretical basis for the effective regulation of collusion behavior of the algorithm.Because of the different restrictive effects on market competition,algorithmic conspiracies need to be legally recognized according to different types: first,it is clear that the achievement of algorithmic conspiracies in algorithmic conspiracies is the same as that of traditional conspiracies and is still within the regulation scope of the existing Anti-monopoly Law;Although the collusion behavior of hub-and-spoke algorithm is cross-cutting in horizontal-vertical relationship and there are many forms of transactions,it is still in essence to restrict horizontal competition and should be regulated according to Per se Rule.Secondly,for tacit algorithmic collusion,since the ultimate impact on market competition cannot be determined,a reasonable presumption can be made from the perspective of social welfare,and starting from behavioral evidence,whether tacit algorithmic collusion exists among enterprises can be inferred through intentional similarity.In addition,China’s Anti-monopoly Law can better regulate algorithmic collusion by improving the legislative principles and rules of algorithmic collusion,establishing various forms of litigation rights protection channels,and establishing a diversified legal liability system.