| In the era of big data,algorithm collusion has become a new form of monopoly.On the one hand,the communication,concealment and commercialization of the algorithm provide a realistic basis for collusion.On the other hand,the algorithm provides new technical means and tools for the achievement of collusion and becomes the carrier of collusion.This new type of collusion not only has an impact on the existing theoretical framework,but also puts forward higher requirements for the antimonopoly law enforcement authorities to identify collusion.Therefore,it is particularly necessary to study the theory of algorithm collusion and discuss the practical regulation.Compared with traditional collusion,it is difficult to identify algorithm collusion.In the implicit algorithm collusion,how to deduce the existence of collusion among operators through indirect evidence is a major difficulty faced by anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies.However,the various forms of algorithm-based collusion,especially the hub and spoker-based collusion,pose a great challenge to the traditional monopoly protocol dichotomy.In addition,a new problem highlighted by algorithmic collusion is whether the anti-monopoly law responsibility caused by algorithmic collusion should be assumed by machines or people.However,it must be clear that the identification of algorithm collusion is still inseparable from the existing theoretical framework and analysis principle.On the basis of firmly grasping the subjective consent of people hidden behind the machine,the case is analyzed.In the explicit algorithm collusion,we should find the evidence of the collusion.In the collusion of implicit algorithm,the author deduces the existence of intention connection between operators by applying the indirect principle,and adheres to the principle of case analysis and comprehensive judgment.The rule of "parallel behavior + additional elements" should be adhered to in identifying parallel behavior as implied collusion.In other words,in the communication evidence,it is necessary to analyze whether the algorithm plays the role of a bridge for the collusion,and whether it can be more convenient for the operator to reach the collusion and the way to reach it.In the behavioral evidence,it is necessary to grasp how the operator USES the algorithm to implement the purpose of restricting and eliminating the competition.In the economic evidence,it is necessary to analyze from the economic principle how the operator makes profit by using the algorithm to limit and eliminate the competition.In the environmental evidence,combining with the specific market environment,market structure and market transparency,the existence of collusion is presumed.Of course,based on the complexity of the application of this principle and the particularity of specific cases,it is necessary to pay special attention to the actual competitive effect of different cases in identifying the parallel behavior of tacit algorithm collusion,in addition to the strict distinction between its own business behavior and parallel behavior.Finally,Suggestions on the supervision of algorithm collusion can be made from the perspectives of legislation,law enforcement and industry self-discipline.Under the premise that the existing theory can provide legal explanation for the collusion of algorithm,a series of technical means are adopted to improve the supervision ability of anti-monopoly law enforcement agencies.At the same time,the market mechanism and the self-discipline of the Internet industry are also used to deal with the algorithm to seek new solutions.But it is worth noting that these measures must be carried out in a specific practice case.On the basis of improving relevant legislation,anti-monopoly law enforcement authorities and industry regulatory authorities should not only improve their regulatory capacity,but also fully realize the constant change of collusion mode in the era of big data,so as to achieve the goal of protecting efficiency and competition... |
PDF Full Text Request