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Research On The Allocation Ratio Of Fuel Vehicles Of Automobile Enterprises Under The Carbon Emission Allowance Policy Based On Game Theory

Posted on:2022-12-04Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:M ZhangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2492306761450614Subject:Theory of Industrial Economy
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In recent years,governments around the word have strengthened the construction of low-carbon economy,and the impact of carbon emission restriction policies on the production strategies of enterprises has gradually increased.The carbon emission quota policies have been proven to be one of the effective means to reduce carbon emissions.At present,China has begun to implement the carbon emission quota policies in 9 major industries such as electric power,chemical industry,aerospace and so on.Based on the implementation plans of the carbon quota policies in the automotive industry,it is of great theoretical and practical significance to explore the optimal production strategies of car companies and the regulation strategies of the governments according to the control needs.Game theory is a theory that uses scientific mathematical models to solve decision-making problems.Using game theory for data modeling and extracting basic elements from complex phenomena can improve the accuracy of subsequent data analysis and research on impact factor observation and regulation.It is of theoretical and practical significance to apply game theory to the analysis of the regulation strategies of the implementation of china’s carbon quota policies.Based on game theory,this paper use MATLAB as an experimental platform,combined with the price competition model(Hotelling model)and evolutionary game analysis method to construct a model,under the carbon quota policies at different stages,this paper formulates the production strategies of new energy vehicles(NEV)and fuel vehicles(FV)for car companies,and analyzes the regulation and control strategies of local governments.The effectiveness and accuracy of the game model are then verified using the case of an automobile company.Finally,the sensitivity of the key parameters affecting the decision-making of car companies and local governments are analyzed,and the parameters are optimized,the effect has been verified,and the priority of the parameters is evaluated according to the degree of impact.The main contents and conclusions of this paper are as follows:(1)Discussion on the effect of carbon emission quota policies.According to the utility of car companies,there are three situations.Case A: No carbon emission quota policies are implemented,and the total utility of NEV production by car companies is higher than that of FV production;Case B: If the carbon quota policies are not implemented,the total utility of NEV production by car companies is lower than the total utility of FV production.If the carbon quota policies are implemented,the total utility of NEV production by car companies is higher than that of FV production;Case C: Implementing the carbon quota policies,the total utility of producing NEV is lower than the total utility of producing FV.According to the utility of local governments,there are three situations.Case D: The supervision cost of implementing the carbon emission quota policies is lower than the time cost of transitioning from FV to NEV in the automobile industry;Case E: If the carbon cost is not recovered,the supervision cost of implementing the carbon quota policies are higher than the time cost of transitioning from FV to NEV in the automotive industry.After carbon cost recovery,the monitoring cost of implementing the carbon emission quota policies is lower than the time cost of transitioning from FV to NEV in the automobile industry;Case F: After carbon cost recovery,the governments spend more on oversight than the auto industry in transitioning from FV to NEV.(2)Static evolutionary stability analysis.The static stability analysis is carried out for the cases where there are evolutionary stable points(ESS points)in the four game models(case A,case C,case D,and case F).The analysis results show that when the utility of producing NEV is higher than that of producing FV,regardless of whether the local governments implement the carbon quota policies,the production of NEV is a stable evolution strategy;when the local governments implement the carbon quota policies,if the total utility of producing FV after deducting carbon cost is still higher than the total utility of producing NEV and obtaining carbon value,then the car company will choose to produce FV.In the remaining two cases(case B and case E),the game model does not have an evolutionary stable point(the production strategies of car companies and the regulation strategies of local governments cannot be optimal at the same time),and the static analysis cannot obtain a stable conclusion.(3)Dynamic Evolution Stability Analysis.For the two cases(case B and case E)where a stable conclusion cannot be obtained in the static analysis,a dynamic adjustment mechanism is adopted,and carbon cost is introduced as a dynamic variable to construct a new dynamic game system.It is calculated that there is an asymptotic ESS point in the game system,and its evolution trajectory is a spiral curve inward approaching the center point.The analysis results show that the dynamic adjustment of carbon cost can stabilize the strategic choices of local governments and car companies,and the adjustment of carbon cost is effective for the implementation of carbon quota policies in the auto industry and the regulation of car companies’ production strategies.(4)Empirical Analysis.Based on the case of an automobile company,a simulation model is built using MATLAB software.The simulation results show that when the static analysis does not consider the carbon cost adjustment,the evolution trajectory of the game system presents a closed loop around the center point,and there is no asymptotic trend between local governments and car companies,which verifies the conclusion of the static stability analysis,the strategic choices of local governments and car companies are unstable.With the dynamic adjustment of carbon cost,the trajectory of the system shows a spiral convergence,and there is a Nash equilibrium between the local governments and the car companies,which verifies the conclusion of the stability analysis of the dynamic adjustment.Three random points(May 2020,November 2020,and April 2021)were brought into the model,and the analysis results of NEVs produced by the car company were 0.383,0.479,and 0.628,respectively.According to the annual report data of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology and the company,the actual proportions are 0.375,0.494 and0.604,respectively,which is close to the evolutionary result.The evolution results obtained by the simulation are slightly different from the actual situation but are basically consistent,which verifies the effectiveness and accuracy of the model.(5)Sensitivity analysis of key parameters.Calculate and discuss the proportion of NEV production and the probability of the occurrence of the ideal events(the proportion of NEV produced by car companies tends to be 1 and the proportion of local governments implementing carbon quota policies tends to be 0).The influencing factors include carbon cost,carbon value,production cost of new energy vehicles and fuel vehicles,and public charging pile coverage rate,and use MATLAB software to simulate the effect of key parameters.Simulation results show that the increase in carbon cost is enough to promote the increase in the production proportion of NEVs and shorten the transformation cycle of the automotive industry,but the stimulus effect of excessively increasing carbon cost is marginally decreasing;the increase in carbon value has little impact on the proportion of NEVs production,but it can improve the probability of ideal events;the increase in the production cost of fuel vehicles helps to increase the production proportion of NEVs and the probability of ideal events;the increase in the production cost of new energy vehicles is not conducive to improving the production proportion of NEVs and the occurrence of ideal events,and it will affect the promotion process of NEVs;greatly improving the coverage of public charging piles will help increase the production ratio of NEVs and the probability of ideal events,but it requires long-term efforts of local governments.After adjusting the key parameters and simulating the unadjusted situations,the adjusted dynamic system evolved to a stable state at a faster speed,and the production ratio of NEV increased from 56.7% to 59.5%,and the probability of the ideal events increased from 34% to 48.6%.The simulation results show that the optimization parameters can not only shorten the transformation cycle of the automotive industry and increase the production ratio of NEVs,but also increase the probability of the occurrence of ideal events,which is in line with the policy goals of local governments.
Keywords/Search Tags:Carbon emission quota, Fuel vehicles and new energy vehicles, Government regulation, Corporate production strategies, Game theory
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