Optimization Of Responsive Feeder Transit Network Considering The Interaction Between Managers And Passengers

The responsive feeder transit system mainly includes two main bodies,the manager and the passenger.They have different main body characteristics and interact with each other.Therefore,based on the idea of game theory,this thesis studies the network optimization of the responsive feeder transit according to the interaction between the passenger and the manager.Firstly,this thesis analyzes the research status and trend,and then introduces the responsive feeder transit system from the two main characteristics of the manager and the passenger.This thesis introduces the network design and breass paradox,and analyzes the necessity of network design for the optimization of responsive connecting public transportation network.This thesis expounds the principle of game theory,combined with the method of game theory to solve the problem of"breass paradox" in network design.Then,under the mode of single pick-up and single drop off,the network optimization model is constructed with the vehicle capacity as constraints,including the responsive feeder transit system path optimization model based on user optimization with the minimum total system cost as the objective and the minimum passenger walking cost as the constraint,and the leadership with the minimum total system cost as the objective.This thesis proposes a Stackelberg game model with the goal of minimizing the cost of passenger walking as the subordinate layer,and designs the corresponding genetic algorithm to solve it.Secondly,in the simultaneous transfer mode,combined with the relevant models in the single transfer mode,considering the different types of passengers in the system under the simultaneous transfer mode,the constraints such as the vehicle arrival time and capacity are discussed,and the responsive transfer transit network optimization model under the simultaneous transfer mode is constructed,and the algorithm design is adjusted to solve the related problems under the simultaneous transfer mode.Finally,simulation test and example analysis are carried out to study the optimization of multi vehicle responsive bus network with simultaneous departure.The results show that under the same parameters,the simultaneous pick-up mode can effectively improve the vehicle carrying capacity and reduce the total cost of the system,and the Stackelberg game model dominated by the manager can reduce the total cost of the system and keep the walking cost of passengers within the acceptable range.Based on the Stackelberg game model dominated by the manager under the mode of simultaneous transfer,the reactive feeder bus network optimization can not only reduce the total cost of the system,but also ensure that the walking cost of passengers is within the acceptable range,reduce the vehicle demand of the system,shorten the running time of a single shift,and improve the operation efficiency.In this thesis,we consider the coordination relationship between the vehicle path and the choice of the passenger’s departure station,which can minimize the total cost of the system,improve the system efficiency,promote the development of the responsive connecting transit,solve the travel problem of the suburban residents,and benefit the country and the people.