Simulation Of Bidding Behavior For Electricity Retailers Based On Prospect Theory

With the deepening of power system reform in China,a large number of electricity retailers have participated in the market,which has brought many uncertain effects to the market.In order to reduce the operational risk and ensure the stable operation of the electricity market,it is necessary to simulate the bidding behavior of electricity retailers.At present,most researchers simulate the bidding behavior of electricity retailers based on the assumption that retailers are fully rational.However,electricity retailers have limited cognitive ability and risk preferences,it is difficult to be completely rational for electricity retailers.In reality,most electricity retailers are bounded rational.Therefore,this thesis uses the framework of bounded rationality to analyze and model electricity retailers’ bidding behavior based on prospect theory in the monthly centralized bidding market,which can simulate the bidding behavior of electricity retailers under different market clearing schemes and bidding rules.The main research contents are as follows:1.At first,the bidding behavior of electricity retailers and prospect theory are reviewed and summarized,then the applicability of prospect theory in the simulation of bidding behavior for electricity retailers is discussed.The study believes that the traditional prospect theory is applicable to simulate the bidding behavior of electricity retailers under Pay-As-Bid(PAB)market clearing schemes,while the smooth prospect theory is more applicable for Pay-As-Clear(PAC)market clearing schemes.2.In this thesis,for PAB market clearing schemes,the traditional prospect theory-based bidding models for bounded rational electricity retailers are established,including one-segment bidding behavior simulation model and multi-segment bidding behavior simulation model.At the same time,in order to increase the contrast,the expected value theory-based bidding models for electricity retailers are established,which simulate the bidding behavior of fully rational people.Then examples and sensitivity analysis of above models are solved by the direct traversal method and genetic algorithm.The results show that whatever bidding rules electricity retailers use,the bidding price will be decreased with the increase of the radicalization degree.And for fully rational electricity retailers,the three-segment bidding strategy is same to the one-segment bidding strategy.In addition,the sensitivity analysis results show that the profit reference point,the risk aversion parameter,attitude coefficients have a significant impact on the bidding behavior of electricity retailers under PAB.3.In this thesis,for PAC market clearing schemes,the smooth prospect theory-based bidding models for bounded rational electricity retailers are established,including one-segment bidding behavior simulation model and multi-segment bidding behavior simulation model.In order to increase the contrast,the expected value theory-based bidding models under PAC are establisthed for fully rational electricity retailers,and the nature of model solutions is discussed.It is proved that fully rational electricity retailers’ bidding is the price in user contract in any case.Finally,through the direct traversal method and genetic algorithm,the above models and the sensitivity analysis are solved.The results show that with the increase of the radicalization degree,electricity retailers’ bidding price and expected profit will be decreased.In addition,the profit reference point,the risk aversion parameter and attitude coefficients all affect the bidding behavior of electricity retailers under PAC.Particularly,the attitude coefficients have the greatest effect.It can be seen the conclusions under PAC are different from the results under PAB,which has some references for people to understand the bidding behavior of electricity retailers.