Research On The Impact Of Board Structure On Earnings Management Of Listed Companies In Electric Power Industry

The board of directors is an important part of the corporate governance structure.At the same time,the board of directors is the highest executive body of the company,which plays a supervisory role in the quality of the company’s financial information and is responsible for the authenticity of the financial information.However,in the real market environment,there are different problems in the structure of the board of directors due to the different industries and scales of listed companies,which provides an opportunity for companies to manipulate their earnings for specific purposes.If they need financing,they will deliberately modify the financial statements to improve their earnings.Therefore,there is a common phenomenon of earnings management in listed companies.As a national energy strategic enterprise,the power industry plays an important role in the country’s energy stability.At the same time,the listed companies in the power industry play an important role in the capital market,But listed companies in the power industry also have earnings management problems,so it is necessary to study the relationship between the board structure and earnings management of the listed companies in the power industry.Firstly,this paper reviews the domestic and foreign literature on earnings management of Listed Companies in the power industry and the relationship between board structure and earnings management,and points out the technical roadmap and innovation of this paper.Secondly,it summarizes the concept of earnings management,motivation and methods of earnings management,and introduces the theoretical basis of earnings management.Through the study of relevant literature and listed companies in the power industry,the research indicators of this paper are constructed.Based on the theory of earnings management,this paper puts forward five research hypotheses on the relationship between board structure and earnings management of Listed Companies in the power industry.In order to test the correctness of the hypothesis,the effective data of 107 companies listed on the main board,growth enterprise board and small and medium-sized board from 2006 to 2018 were collected.Through the improvement of the modified Jones model,that is,to measure the degree of earnings management by adding the characteristic index long-term borrowing of the power industry.Using the method of empirical analysis,first descriptive analysis of the data,then correlation analysis and Fisher-ADF test,then regression analysis and robustness test to draw empirical conclusions.Through empirical analysis,this paper draws the following conclusions:the board size of Listed Companies in the power industry has a significant negative correlation with the degree of earnings management;the proportion of independent directors of Listed Companies in the power industry has a significant negative correlation with the degree of earnings management;the part-time general manager of the board of directors of Listed Companies in the power industry has a significant positive correlation with the degree of earnings management;Whether the listed companies of power industry set up audit committee has no significant effect on the degree of earnings management;there is a significant positive correlation between the ownership of directors and the degree of earnings management.Therefore,the board structure of Listed Companies in the power industry will have an impact on earnings management.A scientific and reasonable board structure will effectively reduce the level of earnings management.Based on the empirical analysis,this paper puts forward the relevant strategies from five aspects:to strengthen and improve the scale of the board of directors,to strengthen the construction of the independent director system,to separate the duties of chairman and general manager,to improve the audit committee mechanism of Listed Companies in the power industry,and to maintain a moderate proportion of directors’ shareholding.