Research On The Reduction Of Big Shareholders And Earnings Management

The reform of non-tradable shares enables the stocks held by the major shareholders to circulate freely in the secondary market.In addition to information and absolute controlling advantage,which enables major shareholders to conduct earnings management and manipulate the stock price,in order to achieve the purpose of reducing the holding at a high level or increasing the holding at a low level.If it is not regulated and allowed to develop,it will endanger the stable operation and healthy development of the securities market.Especially for emerging industries such as new energy vehicles,a lot of funds are needed to support technology research and development in the process of development.If managers use earnings management to manipulate corporate performance,which occurs in the behavior of obtaining higher returns through improper reduction,it will seriously interfere with the fairness and fairness of information disclosure in the capital market,and have a negative impact on the judgment of investor,thus affecting the sustainable and healthy development of the industry.Based on the principal-agent theory,information asymmetry theory and other theories,this paper conducts an empirical research on the reduction of shareholders’ holdings,earnings management and the relationship between them by combing the data of listed companies in China’s new energy automobile industry from 2012 to 2017.This paper is divided into six parts.The first part,introduction.It mainly includes the research background and significance,literature review,research content and research methods.The second part,relevant concept definition and theoretical basis.It mainly defines the concept of new energy automobile industry and earnings management,and sorts out the principal-agent theory and information asymmetry theory,laying a foundation for the research of this paper.The third part is the current situation of earnings management in China’s new energy automobile industry.It mainly analyzes the basic situation in 2017,the comprehensive situation from 2012 to 2017,and the differences of earnings management between different regions.The fourth part,research design.Two hypotheses are proposed,and then the modified Jones model is used to evaluate the relationship between the reduction intensity of major shareholders and the degree of earnings management.The fifth part,empirical analysis.Through descriptive statistics and correlation analysis,the relationship between the reduction behavior of major shareholders and earnings management is analyzed,and finally the robustness analysis is verified.The sixth part,research conclusion and suggestion.Through the research,the following conclusions are drawn: first,the listed companies in China’s new energy automobile industry conduct earnings management,and there are differences between different listed companies in accrued earnings management,and the number of listed companies that choose to increase earnings is more than the number that choose to decrease earnings.Secondly,due to differences in geographical location,natural resources,development conditions and external governance environment,more than 70% of 178 listed companies in China’s new energy automobile industry are concentrated in the eastern region.Third,major shareholders of China’s new energy automobile industry generally conduct earnings management before the reduction,and the greater the reduction of shareholders,the deeper the degree of shareholders’ manipulation of the company’s earnings.