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Research On The Motivation And Prevention Of Controlling Shareholders’ “Tunneling” In Family Listed Companies

Posted on:2022-05-02Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y X ZhangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2491306563461714Subject:Master of Accounting
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As an important part of Chinese listed companies,family listed companies have made an indelible contribution to our country’s economic growth.In 2019,the problem of "Tunneling" by controlling shareholder of family listed companies has become increasingly serious.The case company selected in this article,Antong Holdings,has only been listed for three years.The controlling shareholder Guo Brothers has embezzled a total of 10.56 billion yuan in interests,which has seriously harmed the interests of investors and brought bad effects.In the context of the continuous optimization of my country’s system construction and the ever-increasing penalties for violations of regulations,the frequent "Tunneling" behaviors of controlling shareholders of family listed companies have deep motivations that have practical research significance.Existing related research and theories have fully summarized the characteristics of family businesses in terms of corporate governance and financial goals,and explained the“Tunneling” behavior of the controlling shareholders of listed companies from the perspective of obtaining control rights and private benefits under the separation of control rights and cash flow rights.Formation mechanism,but few studies take family listed companies as the research object,combine the characteristics of family companies,and the company’s internal and external factors,systematically analyze the motivation of the controlling shareholders of family listed companies to "tunnel",and propose targeted preventive countermeasures.Based on this,this article puts forward a research question: What are the reasons for the “Tunneling” of the controlling shareholder of the family listed company? How to prevent the “Tunneling” of the controlling shareholder of the family listed company?In response to the above research questions,this article summarizes the relevant literature and theories,and analyzes the path of the company’s major shareholders’ hollowing out,referring to the fraud triangle theory,and specifically analyzes the major shareholders’ hollowing out from the three aspects of pressure,opportunities and excuses.Motivation.And on the basis of the results of the analysis of the motivation,from the perspective of the supervisor,summarize the existing system and norms of our country,and put forward preventive measures against the tunneling behavior of the major shareholders of family listed companies in terms of optimizing the supervision system and strengthening the supervision mechanism.Based on the research on the motivation of the major shareholders of the case company,the main conclusions are as follows: First,the huge capital demand of the family due to business expansion,financial difficulties and other factors will encourage family members to pursue short-term family interests,and even Maintaining family interests as an excuse to embezzle the interests of listed companies;second,the family relies on the dominant shareholding position and the control chain constructed by the family’s social capital,as well as my country’s current deficiencies in system construction for independent directors and board of supervisors.The tunneling behavior of the major shareholders of the family business provides an opportunity.As for the preventive countermeasures against hollowing out of major shareholders of family listed companies,this article believes that,first,the regulatory authorities should actively implement the new "Securities Law" on investor protection and punishment for violations of information disclosure.At the same time,the supporting system needs to be further improved.In order to fully implement the purpose of investor protection;second,the regulatory authorities can use the media,social organizations and other forces to promote the establishment of an entrepreneurial reputation monitoring mechanism,and guide the actual controller or director of the family business to establish the value of diligence and due diligence.
Keywords/Search Tags:Family business, Listed company, Tunneling
PDF Full Text Request
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