Study On The Shell Listed Family Enterprises And The Hollowing Out Of Major Shareholders

With the development of the capital market,in order to obtain high-quality financing channels to support the realization of enterprise value,more and more enterprises choose to go public,in this process,the agency problems are frequent,of which,the most prominent is due to the majority shareholders encroach on the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders caused by the second type of agency problems.In the second kind of agency problem,the separation of control and cash flow right is the main reason for the large shareholders to carry out the act of interest appropriation,in which when the majority shareholder's shareholding ratio occupies the advantage or directly in the management of the company,the case of the majority shareholder's practice of the act of interest appropriation is more common.Most of China's family-owned enterprises through the shell of this indirect way to complete the listing,which is different from foreign developed countries listed companies,but also different from domestic state-owned enterprises.The main reason lies in two points,on the one hand,the original intention of the establishment of China's securities market is to serve the restructuring of state-owned enterprises,for the approval of stock public offering for a long time there is a very serious tendency to administrative,as a private economic component of the family business is difficult to obtain direct listing indicators;On the other hand,China's application for direct listing of enterprises in all aspects have more stringent conditions,for the general family business,the threshold of IPO is too high.The shell listing has not existed the difficulties of approval policy,but also avoided the harsh conditions required for direct listing,therefore,the shell listing has become a shortcut to the listing of China's family-owned enterprises,but it also led to many problems.According to the relevant statistics,overall,the domestic choice of direct listing of family-owned enterprises due to the high requirements of direct listing,the relevant departments of strict supervision,performance is still good,the quality of assets injected and profitability are higher than the market average.The performance of the shell-listed family-owned enterprises is a lot of problems,and its operating performance is significantly worse than that of the directly listed family-owned enterprises,and there are a large number of controlling shareholders' self-interested behavior.In addition,in China's family-listed enterprises,there is a common occupation of control of the family "one big" problem,and most of the family members directly in the board of directors or management,which facilitates the majority shareholder family for their own interests and listed companies "empty",thus infringing the interests of small and medium-sized shareholders.Therefore,strengthening the review and supervision of the reorganization and listing of shell-listed family-owned enterprises at the policy level is of great significance to reduce the incentive for controlling shareholders to realize private income by acquiring control.Through the case study method,this paper analyzes the typical case of Chengdu Huaze Cobalt Nickel being hollowed out by the Wang family,first of all,the motivation of the family hollowing out the listed company,and secondly,the specific analysis of the specific means used by the family to hollow out the listed company,and finally,This paper analyzes the consequences of the family's emptying and provides the corresponding policy recommendations to the regulatory authorities.In the past study,researchers believe that the main motivation of large shareholder families to carry out hollowing out behavior of listed companies comes from the asymmetry of information of large and small shareholders and the failure of the mechanism of equity checks and balances,and this paper focuses on the analysis of the motivation and behavior of the controlling shareholders themselves.Through this study,it is found that the behavior of controlling shareholders is influenced by their own characteristics,and the family enterprises that choose to list on the back are often of poor quality and have a lower non-monetary association with listed companies,which make them more prone to self-interest.Therefore,when the relevant departments review the shell listing of family enterprises,they should strengthen the concern about the quality of the controlling shareholders' own assets and their profitability,and provide a new perspective for the management of the controlling shareholder's hollowing behavior at the regulatory level.