Research On The Selection Of Modality Of Green Supply Chain With Uncertain Supplier Type

Currently,a "green wave" is sweeping the world,and a large number of firms are actively responding to the calling of “Green and Environment Protection”,starting with the implementation of green manufacturing technologies,research and development and use of green materials,and so on to create a more environmentally friendly green supply chain.As the concept of environmental protection has been deeply rooted in the minds of the people,consumers’ consumption behaviors have also become more environmentally friendly,that is,they have a higher demand for green products and the willingness to accept higher prices for green products.Therefore,as a brand owner who sells products,he has the motivation to ask his suppliers to provide more environmentally friendly products.Accordingly,the supplier will make efforts to improve the environmental friendliness of their products.Generally,the higher the cost invested by the supplier to improve equipment,develop environmentally friendly materials,and update the waste water and waste gas treatment process,the more environmentally friendly the products are.In the meantime,this green investment is a one-time initial investment,and can reduce the unit cost of subsequent product production.However,the green costs invested by different suppliers are different.When the green cost invested by a supplier is higher,the product he produces is more environmentally friendly,and the unit cost of the product is lower.There exit differences in the green costs invested between suppliers.When this green cost is the supplier’s private information,the brand owner has an incentive to identify the true green cost type of the supplier.In order to portray these elements,we establish a model consists of a sustainability manufacturer and a brand owner in the presence of asymmetric information,combines the signaling model with the screening model,which investigates the brand owner’s choice on modality for co-operation between brand owner’s bidding mode(active information screening)and the quotation mode(waiting for the supplier to signal)when supplier’s green investment is unobservable.The main model of this paper is the signaling model and the screening model under the information asymmetry.At the same time,the signaling model and the screening model under the information symmetry are taken as the benchmark model.This paper mainly analyzes the strategies of supplier and brand owner in these two modes,and finally analyzes the profit of the brand owner and obtains the mode selection strategy of the brand owners.The main conclusions of this paper are as follows: Firstly,under the information symmetry,the model choice of the brand is only related to the retained earnings of the supplier in the bidding model: when the retained earnings of the supplier is too high,the brand owner chooses the quotation model,otherwise the brand owner chooses the bidding model.And from the perspective of the threshold of retained earnings,brand owner is willing to give high-type suppliers more retained earnings in the bidding model.Secondly,under the information asymmetry,in the quotation model,the higher the probability that the supplier is of the high-type,the less the high-type supplier wants to reveal their true type to the brand,that is,the supplier is more inclined to use the wholesale price in pooling equilibrium at this time;while the brand owners do not like to be confused,because at this time the brand owner cannot judge the true type of the supplier,and cannot accurately make the order quantity decision based on the supplier type.In the bidding model,when the cost difference between suppliers is greater and the probability that a supplier is high-type is higher,the brand owner prefers to use a closing strategy to close low-type supplier and thus can only cooperate with high-type supplier.Thirdly,under asymmetric information,intuitively we might think that brand chambers prefer a quotation model that does not require any cost.However,through calculations,we found that,under given parameter conditions,brand owners are actually more willing to choose a bidding mode that requires payment of information rent,because brand owners can master more initiative under the bidding mode.Finally,under the information asymmetry,whether it is a quotation model or a bidding model,brand owners are more inclined to cooperate with high-type supplier.Therefore,for suppliers,making themselves more environmentally friendly is not only in response to the calling for green manufacturing,but also to improve their core competitiveness in business cooperation.