Research On The Equilibrium Of Dual-channel Supply Chain Network Considering Competition Under The Incentive And Punishment Mechanism Of Carbon Emission

With the acceleration of economic globalization,in order to survive in competition,many enterprises adopt the mode of supply chain cooperation.As more and more enterprises join the supply chain,simple chain structure gradually becomes complex network structure.Therefore,the management problems of supply chain network have become a focused issue of the business community and academia.Among them,supply chain network equilibrium analysis is an important direction of supply chain network research.The management of supply chain network is also increasingly complicated due to the changing social background.On the one hand,the increasingly severe climate problem has brought serious impacts on the healthy life of human beings,and the reduction of carbon emissions has become a hot issue of social concern.Relevant departments put forward many feasible management methods,including carbon tax,carbon trading or incentive and punishment mechanism.Among them,the incentive and punishment mechanism of carbon emission can not only make enterprises pay for the "carbon" exceeding the quota,but also turn the "carbon index" saved into an asset,which has a very effective regulating effect.On the other hand,with the development of economy and the improvement of productivity,competition has become a topic that cannot be ignored.Competition among enterprises is reflected in various aspects,among which channel competition and brand competition are the two most common forms of competition in product sales.With the rapid developm ent of e-commerce,dual-channel have become a popular sales model.The rapid spread of network information and multi-culture has enriched the alternative products that can meet the personalized needs.To sum up,this paper studies the equilibrium problem of dual-channel supply chain network considering competition under the incentive and punishment mechanism of carbon emission.This paper provides the basis for the government and the member enterprises in supply chain network to make decisions.The main research contents of this paper are as follows:First,a system composed of government and dual-channel supply chain network is studied.This paper researched the game between the government and the dual-channel supply chain network.The government as the leader,implements the carbon incentive and punishment mechanism for the follower-the dual-channel supply chain network.Under the mechanism,the supply chain network makes the optimal decision.Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium model of dual-channel supply chain network under carbon emission incentive and punishment mechanism is established with the goal of maximizing revenue by using bi-level programming and variational inequality theory.Secondly,on the basis of above research,we respectively considered the influence of channel competition and brand competition on the decision-making behavior of each member in the dual-channel supply chain network.The Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium models of the dual-channel supply chain network considering channel competition and brand competition under the carbon emission incentive and punishment mechanism are separately established.Finally,numerical examples are analyzed to obtain the equilibrium strategies and verify the regularity of the models.The results show that:(1)Under the carbon emission incentive and punishment mechanism,the gradual relaxation of the mechanism implemented by the government will increase the benefits of supply chain network and reduce the benefit of the government.The system benefit is influenced by them,which shows a trend of increase first and then decrease.Therefore,a reasonable carbon emission incentive and punishment mechanism can be formulated to maximize the benefit of the system.(2)In the case of channel competition,the higher consumer loyalty to retail channel is,the better it is for retailers,and the disadvantage is for other decision makers.In addition,under the condition of complete competition,it is difficult for a single retailer to gain a competition advantage by providing customer service.But all retailers can work together to improve the service standard of the retail industry so as to gain advantage in channel competition.(3)In the case of brand competition,the greater consumer loyalty to a brand product,the more favorable it is to the manufacturer of the brand,and the more unfavorable it is to the manufacturer of the other brand.The manufacturer’s benefit can be guaranteed when it has a brand advantage.While retailers,government and system have higher benefits when products brands vary widely.In addition,under the perfect competition conditions,it is difficult for a single manufacturer to gain brand competitive advantage by providing customer service.Therefore,more attention should be paid to cultivating consumer loyalty to its brand products.