Related-party Transactions Of Listed Companies And The Tunneling Of Major Shareholders Behavioral Research ——A Case Study Of Kang De Xin

China’s capital market is formed later than the United States and other foreign capital markets.Most listed companies have a pyramid structure of equity.It takes time to develop into a mature securities market.Investor protection laws are not sound.Large shareholders usually use their rights to surplus management.Or capital operation,and ultimately harm the interests of small and medium shareholders.In this case,it is particularly necessary to pay attention to some controlling shareholders who ignore the law and seek the benefits of invisible related transactions and non-related related transactions.However,due to the asymmetry of information,it is difficult for small and medium investors to learn about these improper related-party transactions,which harms the interests of small and medium investors and creditors.However,compared with the huge gains obtained,the controlling shareholders only need to pay a small legal cost.On January 15,2019,Kang de New Composite Materials Co.,Ltd.had a bond default of 1.5 billion,but the bank account showed more than 15 billion.On January 22,2019,it received an investigation by the China Securities Regulatory Commission for alleged information disclosure violations.Notice,July 5,2019,received prior notice of administrative punishment,the notice stated that Kang de xin had fraudulent and increased profits from 2015 to 2018,and the parent company Kang de Investment Group Co.,Ltd.was listed for non-operating occupation The company’s funds,as well as undisclosed listed company’s affiliated guarantees for Kang de Investment Group.Kang de’s new incident has aroused great concern in the market.How did the "100 billion white horse stocks" once fell into this situation?In view of the above background,the article based on related literature of related party transactions and interest transfer,as well as tunnel hollowing theory,asymmetric information theory,principal-agent theory and private benefit theory of control rights,taking Kang de listed companies as an example,first analyzes Kang de new What related party transactions have taken place,and what are the possible ways for non-operating funds to occupy related party transactions,summarizing the way of benefit transfer;then analyze the motives of the major shareholder Kang de Group to use absolute control to carry out related party transactions,and what caused it Economic consequences;Finally,a case conclusion is given,and recommendations are provided from the six perspectives of group cash management,illegal costs,corporate governance,small and medium shareholders control,information disclosure,and external supervision.This article finds that the major shareholders of listed companies conduct market value management through the daily operation of business fraud and the expansion of asset scale.For the purpose of hollowing out motivation and low financing costs,non-operating occupation of listed company funds and related guarantees,the group adopts an aggressive strategy for business operations and capital operations,the types and characteristics of connected transactions are more complicated.