A Case Study On The Tunneling Mode Of Controlling Shareholders Of Sky Dragon Group

In 2014,China's economy entered a new normal.Since then,the government has continuously deepened the reform of the economic system and improved the environment of the capital market,thus effectively increasing the activity of China's capital market.High directional issuance,sends turn value management tool has been using the art of listed companies,but also raises many questions,one of them is the problem of "tunneling",and the relative concentration of ownership structure of listed companies further intensified the second agency problem,and the relevant laws and regulations system is still not perfect,these factors for the controlling shareholders of listed companies for the indemnif ication provided an opportunity.Although a number of laws have been introduced to restrict the behaviors of major shareholders in order to protect the interests of minority shareholders in China in recent years,with the continuous maturity of the regulatory system,many listed companies have developed a new mode of interest transmission through the form of "playing the edge",among which "private placement + high transfer + shareholder reduction" is one of them.Increasingly hidden interests transmission mode has inflicted seriously infr inge on the interests of minority shareholders,therefore,this article will take the Sky Dragon Group as a case study object,with principal-agent theory,asymmetric information theory,signal theory and tunneling theory as theoretical basis,the analysis Sky Dragon Group on the implementation of private placement and high to send two financial decisions,to explore whether the purchase in the future for the company to high to send capital basis,and high sends turn whether paves the way for major shareholders holdings set now,there is a internal relations between the two decisions,and is involved in the indemnification.Then,this paper makes a detailed analysis of the reduction of the company's major shareholders,so as to prove whether the company's controlling shareholders are tunneling.Finally,this paper deeply analyzes the operation path of the new tunneling mode of the Sky Dragon Group controlling shareholders and its economic consequences.The results of this paper show that the controlling shareholders of the Sky Dragon Group set up a channel to transfer their interests by using the mode of "private placement + high transfer + shareholder reduction".The main purpose of the company's private placement is to help major shareholders purchase shares at a low price,to ensure their position of control,and at the same time for the future high transfer to supplement the capital reserve.In addition,the company still chooses to implement high transfer even though it does not have enough profitability to support it.Its main purpose is to help the controlling shareholders reduce their shares and deliver benefits to them.Therefore,the author suggests that listed companies should improve their internal governance system and make reasonable decisions.Medium and small investors should change their investment concepts,improve their information recognition ability,and the regulatory authorities should further strengthen the supervision mechanism.It is hoped that this paper can help the regulatory authorities and investors to identify the hidden chain of interest transmis sion by the controlling shareholders of listed companies and provide some help for the improvement of relevant laws and regulations in China in the future.