Research On The Impact Of Executive Compensation Incentives And Internal Control Quality On Inefficient Investment

Investment activity is an important behavior in the production and operation of a company,which is related to the stability and sustainability of the value-added and development of the company.Therefore,the company has been committed to optimizing the allocation of resources and making efficient investments to maximize the value of the company.Affected by factors such as information asymmetry,in the process of entrusting agents in modern enterprises,inefficient investment by listed companies in the coal industry is widespread,which not only affects the healthy and sustainable development of enterprises,but also causes a huge waste of social resources.In the context of overcapacity,supply-side reforms and weak internal control of coal enterprises,the problem of inefficient investment by listed companies in the coal industry has become increasingly prominent.Under the principal-agent system,corporate executives are the main decision makers of investment,behavior.The implementation of scientific and effective incentive and restraint policies to improve the quality of corporate internal control and effectively restrict the investment decision-making behavior of corporate executives is of great significance to curbing inefficient investment by enterprises.Based on the domestic and foreign research results on the impact of executive compensation incentives and internal control quality on inefficient investment,this paper defines the concepts of executive compensation incentives,internal control and internal control quality and inefficient investment,using investment theory,commission Agency theory,information asymmetry theory and other theories analyze the impact of executive compensation incentives on inefficient investment,the impact of internal control quality on inefficient investment,and the moderating effect of internal control quality,and put forward research hypotheses and determine the principle of variable selection Relevant variables were selected and defined to construct a multiple regression model;2010-2019 data of listed companies in the coal industry in Shenzhen and Shanghai were selected as the research samples,and regression analysis and correlation tests were performed.The results showed that:executive compensation incentives and coal companies Over-investment is significantly positively correlated with under-investment;the quality of internal control is significantly negatively correlated with the over-investment and under-investment of coal companies,that is,the quality of internal control can effectively restrain the inefficient investment of coal companies;the quality of internal control is in the executive compensation There is a significant moderating effect between incentives and inefficient investment.