Evolutionary Game And Case Study Of Conflict Of Interests Among Water-related Agents In The Pilot Area Of Water Resources Fee To Tax

This paper is based on the research results of the National Natural Science Foundation of China "Evaluation on Effects of Water Resources Tax Reform and Policy Optimization"(71974051).The reform of water resources tax,which has been piloted successively in Hebei province and other 9 provinces,has broken the old water resources management system and is a significant adjustment of interest relationships in the field of water resources.Therefore,in the process of tax reform,there must be a game relationship of intertwined interests among water related subjects.In view of the pilot work of water resources tax reform,this paper constructs three evolutionary game models among local governments,within local governments and between local governments and enterprises.Based on the replication dynamic equation,the evolution law,behavior characteristics and stable equilibrium point of the evolution system are discussed.The evolution model is simulated by Matlab software,and the dynamic evolution path and convergence trend of the game system under different conditions are analyzed.Finally,combined with the current situation of water resources tax reform pilot in Hebei Province,the conclusion of the game model is further verified and applied.The results show that:(1)in the game model between local governments,the external effect has little influence on the local government's strategy choice.The water resources tax,the proportion of environmental quality and the constraint degree of the central government are in direct proportion to the local government's willingness to choose the active implementation strategy,while the implementation cost,the degree of economic loss,the proportion of water charges and economic conditions are in direct proportion to the local government's willingness to choose the active implementation strategy(2)the cooperation cost,punishment and government financial subsidies affect the behavior of water conservancy department and tax department;(3)water saving cost,water saving efficiency,punishment and tax rate setting all affect the strategy choice in the process of water resources tax reform.At the same time,based on the case analysis of the water resource tax reform pilot in Hebei Province,the study found that while Hebei Province has achieved significant improvements in water resource tax revenues,and the steady improvement of corporate water-saving awareness and technological innovation capabilities,there is a gap between water conservancy departments and taxation departments.The status quo of low collaboration efficiency and increased water burden on enterprises.Therefore,we can reform the existing performance appraisal system,formulate scientific and reasonable differential tax rates,force enterprises to save water,and increase supervision to improve the implementation efficiency of water resources tax reform;strengthen the construction of water resources tax reform related information platform,and reduce the cost of cooperation between water conservancy department and tax department.Through environmental subsidies,transfer payments and other means to reduce the implementation cost of local governments and water-saving costs of enterprises,stimulate the enthusiasm of high-water consumption enterprises for technological innovation,so as to improve the efficiency of water use,so as to promote the efficient implementation of water resources tax reform.