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Co-Evolution Of Complex Network Public Goods Game Under The Edges Rule

Posted on:2021-01-07Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Y B LiFull Text:PDF
GTID:2480306230978309Subject:Software engineering
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Cooperative behaviors exist in real life everywhere.Whether in nature or human society,when there is a conflict between group interests and individual interests,there are always some phenomena of sacrificing some individual interests and protecting group interests.This is contrary to the evolutionary law of the organism itself.People want to study the mystery behind this.Since its birth,game theory has attracted the attention of researchers in various fields because of its close integration with social real life.The researchers abstracted the game model from real life,explored the cooperation and evolution in the game,and studied the reasons for influencing the behavior of participants from various fields such as economics,biology,computer science,and sociology.Since the 1990 s,the complex network field has made great strides,which has led to another leap in the game.Evolutionary game research on complex networks provides a systematic theoretical framework for game theory.In a complex network,the nodes in the network are abstracted as game individuals,and the nodes and the edges of the nodes in the network are abstracted as complex relationships between game individuals.In the past two decades,with the deepening of game research,a lot of research work on network structure and evolutionary games has emerged.It is well known that there is a close relationship between the topological relationship of game networks and game behavior.The content of this article is to start from the association of network structure and evolutionary game,and it is divided into two major aspects: First,starting with several classic complex network models,the impact of different network structures on the behavior of participants in a simple group game model is discussed,Use mathematical derivation to explore the sources of income and differences in income of participants who choose different strategies,and find the reasons that affect the production and evolution of cooperation.In the second aspect,inspired by the previous researchers,with the conclusions obtained in the first research content,a co-evolution model of game-side rules for public goods on complex networks is proposed.In the model,the players ’strategic choices dynamically update the game network,and at the same time,the changes in the game network’s topology profoundly affect the players’ choices.Without any human intervention,people can choose to decide whether to keep the neighbors of the game according to their own profit situation.The connection of the side as a reward and punishment mechanism makes the game network complete its own evolution.After verification by Monte Carlo simulation and experimental economics,the side-rule coevolution model can promote the generation and evolution of cooperation in public goods games,and can achieve large-scale cooperation under a small gain factor.The reason for this phenomenon is that the edge rule model can promote the production of blockbuster in the game network,thus triggering the emergence of cooperation.In summary,this paper uses three evolutionary game research methods,proposes a co-evolution of complex network public goods game under the edges rule s,and verifies that the model promotes the evolution of cooperation in public goods games.In addition,the design of the side-rule co-evolution model allows players to self-organize and evolve,and in the process of pursuing the maximization of self-revenue,self-optimize the network structure.At the same time,in the research process,we have found a measure index of network topology-the residual mean degree distribution entropy,which can predictively fit the collaborator density curve to a certain extent,which facilitates the study of network topology and strategy co-evolution.
Keywords/Search Tags:complex network, co-evolution, game of public goods, network structure
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