| This project empirically analyzes Domhoff's higher circles and the power structures of the Middle East Institute (MEI). Domhoff proposes a community of corporate owners and executive managers dominate control of the US, creating an upper social class through institutions that facilitate social cohesion and shared interests developed through policy-planning groups. The MEI, founded in 1946, is a non-profit, non-partisan think tank and cultural center headquartered in Washington DC. The study utilizes observations of the MEI in a qualitative analysis, and a combination of open source and privately collected data in its quantitative analyses. Direct observations were made from the author's multiple visits to the MEI's annual conferences from 2007-2009. The historical data on the 254 MEI Board of Governors and its 238 affiliated organizations, the attendants from the 2008 banquet, the attendants from the 2007 conference, and the sponsors from the 2007-2008 conferences was primarily collected from 2007-2009. The results show the MEI is many things to many people. However, the interests the MEI primarily serve are those of American super-major oil companies, the US State Department, and Saudi Arabia. Collective power is shared principally by ExxonMobil, Saudi Arabia, and the US State Department. Distributive power benefits the GCC states and allows US Ambassadors to Middle East states, Assistant Secretaries for Near East Affairs, and executives from Chevron and Exxon to govern the MEI. Ultimately, the institutions who share the collective power share the winnings of the distributive power. The study concludes Domhoff's theory of corporate class-domination fails to properly take into account the role of the State in the functioning of US society, seen through the MEI power structures, particularly foreign States and corporations owned by foreign States. Domhoff also fails to appreciate inclusive aspects of the policy-planning process that open traditional modes of corporate-class domination to social change. |
