THE TRUMAN ADMINISTRATION AND EUROPEAN RECONSTRUCTION, 1947-1950: CORPORATE INTERNATIONALISM AND FOREIGN AID

This study's central thesis is that the political and economic objectives of globally oriented corporate managers and investors shaped the Truman administration's aproach to European reconstruction under the Marshall Plan. During 1947, as postwar recovery threatened to falter, government officials and corporate internationalists feared that European instability could turn the world balance of power against the U.S. Failure to prevent such an outcome, they believed, could threaten the future of American capitalism by putting it in a statist direction.;During the Marshall Plan's implementation phase, ECA provided commodity aid to prevent declines in consumption and investment that could have disrupted reconstruction and tilted Western Europe to the left. ECA supplemented financial aid with pressure for economic policy reforms to stabilize currencies, raise investor confidence, and promote economic growth. Policymakers believed that intervention on behalf of reform was necessary because internal political difficulties and U.S.-European disagreements could delay action. U.S. officials also sought close regional cooperation to eliminate nationalist trade barriers, strengthen West Germany's affiliation with the West, and improve European competitiveness in world markets. American pressure during 1949-1950 guided European efforts to integrate regional markets and establish a Franco-German economic entente.;By 1950, U.S. officials agreed that Marshall aid had prevented a serious crisis, but they worried that Europe was insufficiently stable. To check European neutralism, mitigate fears of war and Communism, and secure West German allegiance to NATO Europe, the U.S. turned to a program of massive rearmament. In this way, the Truman administration hoped to strengthen the trans-Atlantic political economy that it saw as the basis for global capitalist order.;Legislative approval of reconstruction assistance was not automatic because Republican business nationalist legislators criticized large-scale financial commitments to Western Europe. To influence Congress, the Truman administration launched diplomatic initiatives, organized public relations campaigns, and compromised with the Republicans on Marshall Plan budgets and organizational structure. Executive-Congressional compromises left the newly-organized Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) with considerable latitude in implementing the corporate internationalist program for a stable West European political economy.