| The purpose of my dissertation is to argue that there is such a thing as Jewish ethics and that it relates to Jewish law in a way that does not denigrate either one nor conflate them. In developing my thesis, I will begin with the hypothesis that Jewish ethics is a part of Jewish law but is not isomorphic to it. Jewish law determines how its adherents, as individuals and as a collective, are to act; their actions are both legally required and ethically significant. Jewish ethics, however, also includes how a person relates to his or her ethico-legal obligations; it is concerned with how the practice and study of Jewish law influences a person's character development. Therefore, Jewish law is of ethical import, in terms of what it prescribes, in terms of how a person accepts the law deontologically, and in terms of how it influences him or her aretologically. The consequentialist aspect of Jewish ethics vis-a-vis Jewish law relates to how jurists approach cases in question and in how people make decisions when religio-ethical values are in conflict.;By aiming to adopt all three aspects into one tri-faceted Jewish ethics, I seek to provide a different description of each aspect than those commonly associated with them. For example, the deontological aspect could not be Kantian, since, by virtue of its relationship with Jewish law, Jewish ethics is not self-legislated but rather is grounded in the Divine will. Similarly, in opposition to the dominant position in consequentialism, Jewish ethics does not always seek to maximize a particular consequential value but rather seeks to maximize continued observance. Contrary to Greek aretological approaches, Jewish ethics, in this conception, does not consider eudaimonia as a goal, but rather sees Shlemut as a potential but not necessary consequence of other, more primary objectives, such as fearing the Lord and following the Divine will. |
