SOVIET STRATEGY IN SOUTH ASIA 1953-1977. FOCUS: BALUCHISTAN

The thesis of this study is to prove that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics sought to exacerbate existing instability in Pakistani Baluchistan to enhance its influence--which would lead to an independent Baluchistan or a reordered Pakistan, either of which might allow the USSR at some time to establish a direct overland route to the mouth of the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. The study is based primarily on empirical evidence and original source Soviet, Pakistani, Afghan, Indian, and Iranian sources. It establishes initially the geopolitical relationship of Pakistan and its Baluchistan province, and ties it in with recorded foreign relations with neighboring countries.;Internal unrest in Pakistani Baluchistan is chronicled as well as the views and attitudes of the neighboring powers. Several facets of Soviet motivations are examined to include the need to establish a buffer zone to the south as has been established in Eastern Europe; the much-discussed "urge to the sea"; the perception of a Soviet need to outflank China in the Indian Ocean region; the desire to establish the USSR as an Asian power and therefore a principal spokesman for the area; the desire to keep the west and China out of the litteral; and the usefulness of maintaining a strong Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean to assist in these goals and possibly, in a future war, to be in a position to interdict oil lines of communication to the west and to Japan.;The study concludes that while an independent Baluchistan might prove advantageous to the USSR, it is not willing to maintain a constant, forceful, open foreign policy of inciting rebellion in the province. The USSR is willing, however, to conduct its foreign policy with any of the major foreign powers in the region on an overt plane, while still willing to listen to calls for national liberation within the zone. It is apparent however that save for a very bloody civil war in Baluchistan between 1973-1977, there is no single, major Baluchi opposition group strong enough to warrant constant and significant support from the USSR. Until such time as such an opposition group appears on the scene, the USSR will continue to encourage national liberation movements in its press, while conducting normal foreign policy with the recognized governments in the region.;The principal time-frame of the study is the post-Stalin period extending from 1953 through 1977. The thesis examines Soviet foreign policy in the area and addresses a range of Soviet goals extending from expansion of influence through legitimate means (Tashkent and Simla), support of national liberation movements (the National Awami Party in Bangladesh, formerly East Pakistan), and the rising power and influence of the Soviet Navy in the region. In this regard, an examination is made of the role of seapower in Soviet foreign policy.