The absurd in immanence: Expression and substantial immanence in Spinoza's 'Ethics'

I find that overlooking the importance of the role of expression in Spinoza leads to problematic theories of parallelism (even though Spinoza never used the term parallelism) and certain problematic preconceptions about truth in Spinoza. By criticizing the lack of inclusion of expression in analyzing Spinoza we can alleviate the problems of parallelism by disproving its basis. Consequently, a dual problem emerges regarding the relation between imagination, reason, and intuitive science, as well as how we make sense of acquiring knowledge by reason and intuitive science. This is also a problem regarding immanence. For, if we cannot explain the relation between imagination, reason, and intuitive science, then immanence would require an unexplained reason for this relation, i.e. an eminent explanation. It is my hypothesis that this problem can be solved by acknowledging the absurd in Spinoza's epistemology and ethics. I argue that the role of expression can be expanded to include the relation between ideas and ideas of ideas (etc.) to explain the relation between imagination, reason, and intuitive science. This shows that the absurd is not external to epistemology but is internal to these epistemic relations. However, Spinoza relies on a narrow conception of the absurd and only recognizes it as reductio ad absurdum. Some reason exterior to his thought is required to explain his epistemic relations. This reason is hidden within the idea of God as salvation; although this salvation returns us to reason, it still requires an exterior cathartic relation. The cathartic relation is a return, but it is a return to God and not to substance. Thus I argue that for Spinoza, substance is different than God when considering this return. Ultimately paradoxical because God and substance are supposed to be identical, we should not dismiss Spinoza's philosophy in light of this difference. Rather, we can rehabilitate what is powerful about immanence, its principle of reflexive incorporation of everything into itself, as conceiving of substance without God. We should incorporate the absurd into immanence and give up God. This is a substantial immanence that includes the absurd in the expressive nature of substance.