ITALY, AUSTRIA-HUNGARY AND THE BALKANS, 1904-1914: ITALY'S APPRAISA

The general outlines of Italian foreign policy in 1914-15, investigated by various able historians, are well known, and the conclusions drawn are not surprising. Italy's entrance into war against Austria-Hungary, interpreted either as the final fulfillment of "old" Risorgimento aspirations or as the product of a "new" naked imperialism, is seen as emerging from a calculated shift in Italy's international alignment, following decades of simultaneous rivalry and alliance with Austria-Hungary. This study does not disagree with this general view; but it argues that the reality is even more complicated, and that Italy's realignment in 1914-15 was not really a break with the policy of the past.;Prewar Italian policy is often linked to the notion of the so-called balance of power, even though a genuine balance of power seldom existed in Europe before World War I. A policy of exploiting the balance of power presupposes not only an ability to perceive one's own interests and act effectively in international affairs--something Italy often could not do--but also and especially the ability to discern the true state of the European balance and correctly gauge the policy and strength of each of the other powers. Mainly because Italy expected the Austro-Hungarian Empire sooner or later to collapse, this study focuses on Italy's perception and appraisal of Austria-Hungary and the nearby Balkan states.;The object of this study is twofold: to examine Italy's appraisal of Austria-Hungary and the various Balkan states as its leaders, officials and representatives abroad viewed the general internal and military situation, the foreign policy, and the political interests, tendencies and prospects for survival and future growth of each of these states during the decade before World War I; and to show how this appraisal influenced Italian policy towards Austria-Hungary and the Balkans, and the manner in which Italy intervened in World War I.;Of crucial importance in this appraisal was the unfolding struggle between what Italians considered to be two of the most powerful ideologies of the age--Pan-Germanism and Panslavism. Italian leaders repeatedly had to ask themselves whether Austria-Hungary was becoming a safer or more dangerous ally and neighbor. Accustomed as they were normally to delay the attempted fulfillment of their country's territorial aspirations until the "ripe" moment. Italians knew that either a partial internal transformation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire or its complete disappearance threatened Italy with national disaster, especially if a new order either unfavorable to Italian interests, or incompatible with the principles of European equilibrium, or both, superseded the old. Thus, Italian policy was a unique merger or synthesis of rival, prescriptive Austrophile and Austrophobe viewpoints within the Italian foreign service.;In some concrete ways, Italy's intervention and war aims in 1915, its wartime diplomacy and its postwar initiatives and rivalry with France in Eastern Europe had their roots in the prewar period. The Yugoslav question troubled the Italians throughout the period under examination, not merely after Serbia actively began to champion the Yugoslav movement. Italy alternately sought territorial gains from Austria and the Triple Entente mainly in order to protect itself and contain the Slavs, not in order to destroy Austria-Hungary. Hence it failed to claim Fiume in 1914-15 and preferred to see a large Hungary survive the war. Harsh realities, however, insured that the final outcome of the war would be markedly different from what the Italian foreign office either expected or preferred.